40 See “Statement of Comrade Pol Pot,” January 5, 1979; Sihanouk, Prisonnier des khmers rouges, pp. 316—320; and Chanda, Brother Enemy, p. 302. Sihanouk later told James Pringle, “I was mesmerized. I knew [Pol Pot] was mad, but I couldn’t stop listening” (author’s interview with Pringle, February 1991). In 1990 Sihanouk told the Indochina specialist Philippe Devillers that “there are two charismatic people in Cambodia: Pol Pot and I” (Devillers, personal communication).

41 Phandara, Retour à Phnom Penh, p. 186. See also Picq, Au delà du ciel, pp. 151-153; and Chanda, Brother Enemy, pp. 316-317, 344ff. Ieng Sary, who left on the same train, reached the Thai border, without shoes, on January 11 and Beijing three days later. Pol Pot’s immediate destination is not known. He probably fled to Thailand with Nuon Chea.

Chapter Nine

1 See William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy (London, 1984).

2 The most detailed account of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea so far is Michael Vickery, Kampuchea (London 1984), which is favorable to the regime. See also Vairon, “Du Parti Communiste Indochinois,” pp. 272 ff.; and Viviane Frings, Le paysan cambodgien et le socialisme (Paris, 1997). Evan Gottesman’s work in progress should provide a valuable analysis of the period.

3 For details, see Chanda, Brother Enemy, pp. 348ff. Although ASEAN convened meetings throughout the 1980s to deal with the “Cambodian problem,” its first official condemnation of DK occurred in February 1990. See Patrick Raszelenberg and Peter Schier, The Cambodia Conflict: Search for a Settlement (Hamburg, 1997), p. 299.

4 François Ponchaud, Cambodia: Year Zero (New York, 1978). Noam Chomsky and Edward Hermann, After the Cataclysm (Boston, 1979) includes a sustained attack on Ponchaud’s findings, which have stood up better than those of Chomsky and Hermann, as far as the Red Khmers and their policies are concerned. On the metamorphosis of S-21, see Judy Ledgerwood, “The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes: National Narrative,” Museum Anthropology 21 (Spring-Summer 1997): 83—98.

5 On the statistics of regime-related deaths in Democratic Kampuchea, see Michael Vickery, “How Many Died in Pol Pot’s Kampuchea?” BCAS 22 (1988); and Marek Sliwinsky, Une analyse demographique du genocide des khmers rouges (Paris, 1994). See also Office of the Vice President of Democratic Kampuchea in Charge of Foreign Affairs [Khieu Samphan], “What Are the Truth [sic] and Justice about the Accusations against Democratic Kampuchea of Mass Killings from 1975 to 1978?” (n.p., July 1987); and Heder, Khieu Samphan and Pol Pot. Khieu Samphan’s tendentious document admits to fewer than 3,000 deaths as a result of DK “mistakes,” while 30,000 were falsely put to death by “Vietnamese agents”; another 11,000 were killed justifiably because they were Vietnamese agents. In 1980, the text asserts, “about 1.5 million died, victims of Vietnamese aggressors.” The dogmatic hauteur of this document, amateurishly translated from French, suggests that it is vintage Khieu Samphan. In his interview with Nate Thayer in October 1997, Pol Pot referred approvingly to this document when he was asked about the magnitude of deaths under Democratic Kampuchea.