6 FBIS, Daily Reports, December 21, 1975. Cambodia’s break with its past (see, for example, “Over 2,000 Years of Cambodian History Has Virtually Ended,” in FBIS, Daily Reports, January 2, 1976) was a break with hierarchical social arrangements, money, markets, religious practices, higher education, and so on. To achieve these goals, the regime decided to control people’s access to information and food. Suspicious of enemies, the regime even tried to control courtship, “family-ism,” and other remnants of the “old society” (Sangkum chas). For a perceptive discussion of DK ideas, see François Ponchaud, “Social Change in the Vortex of Revolution,” pp. 159-178. Steve Heder (letter to author, August 1991) pointed out that the phrase “independence-mastery” resembles the Chinese slogan di li zi zbu (“Maintain independence and keep the initiative”).

7 For Chinese inspirations for these views, see Zhang Chunqiao, “On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship over the Bourgeoisie,” Peking Review, May 27, 1975; and David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China, 1968-1981 (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), especially pp. 16—31 and 190—204.

8 Chandler, Kiernan, and Boua, eds. and trans., Pol Pot Plans the Future, pp. 130ff. See the confession of Chan Mon, p. 29, which notes that the speed of the plan was disconcerting to those like Chan Mon who allegedly were plotting to undermine Democratic Kampuchea: “If the Plan succeeds by going swiftly, we will grow weaker.”

9 For earlier references to the slogan, see Chandler, Kiernan, and Boua, eds. and trans., Pol Pot Plans the Future, pp. 20—21. In the First National Conference on Learning from Dazhai held in China in October 1975, Hua Guofeng set national targets of 200 to 250 kilograms of agricultural produce per mou (1/15 of a hectare)—that is, exactly 3 metric tons per hectare. See Jonathan D. Spence, In Search of Modern China (New York, 1990), p. 644; and Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China, pp. 66—67. On agriculture under Democratic Kampuchea, see Marie-A. Martin, “La riziculture et la maîtrise de l’eau dans le Kampuchea Démocratique,” Etudes rurales 83 (July-September 1981): 7-44; and Martin, “La politique alimentaire des khmers rouges,” Etudes rurales 99—101 (July-December 1985): 347-365. These studies show that although production increased in many areas under Democratic Kampuchea, some of the regime’s pet ideas—such as the decree that all rice fields measure precisely 1 hectare regardless of topography—had disastrous consequences. Martin also noted that although many DK irrigation works collapsed, several survived into the 1980s. See also Charles Twining, “The Economy,” in Jackson, ed., Cambodia, 1975—1978, pp. 109-150. For the final quotation, see Chandler, Kiernan, and Boua, eds. and trans., Pol Pot Plans the Future, p. 130.

10 On life in the northwest as recorded by two “new people,” see Pin Yathay, L‘utopie meurtrière; and Someth May, Cambodian Witness. See also Vickery, Cambodia, 1975—1982, pp. 100-120. On the motto, see Henri Locard, Le livre rouge de Pol Pot ou les paroles de l’Angkar (Paris, 1996), p. 179.