11 ”Pisaoch klah ompiii ka to’t tu‘l nung ka vay komtech a-Chenla II“ [Some observations on the smashing of contemptible Chenla II], Tung Padevat (December 1971): 27ff. Documents captured in the southwest in early 1971 also failed to mention Vietnamese contributions (Kiernan, HPP, p. 322). But see the Red Khmer notebook in the Pike Archives (Cambodia, May 1971), which mentions ”solidarity of the international liberation front“ but notes that ”foreign participation [in the revolution] is secondary.“ On the intrinsic superiority of the Khmer, see Chandler, ”Seeing Red,“ pp. 34-56. Pol Pot, ”Long Live the 17th Anniversary,“ says nothing about Vietnamese aid in 1970-1975.

12 See Kate Frieson, ”Reluctant Comrades: The Peasantry and the Red Khmers, 1970-1975,“ unpublished paper, 1991; and ”Seckdei nai no’m reboh 870” [Guidance from 870], Tung Padevat (February 1972).

13 See Shawcross, Sideshow, especially pp. 220-235; Walter von Marschal, The War in Cambodia: Its Causes and Military Development (London, 1975), pp. 112ff.; and U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “The Short-Term Prospect for Cambodia (SNIE 57-73).” In May 1973 the Khmer Republic called for military volunteers. Only fifty-two young men signed up (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “The Situation in Cambodia, July 1973,” Report 7333/73, p. 2). By then the republic’s armed forces numbered more than 200,000.

14 Kiernan, HPP, pp. 331ff. For the eyewitness accounts, see Thion and Kiernan, Khmer rouges! pp. 43-97; Timothy Carney, Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussion (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977), pp. 34—55 (a partial translation of Sarin); and Ith Sarin, Sronoh proloeung Khmer [Lament for my Khmer beloved] (Phnom Penh, 1973).

15 Carney, Communist Party Power, p. 9 (n45). See also “The Red Khmers’ Organization and Activities” (Pike Archives, March 1974); and Kiernan, HPP, pp. 336ff. In September 1971 Sar and ninety other “Cambodian intellectuals” signed a twelve-page declaration attacking Lon Nol and supporting the United Front. For the text in translation, see Malcolm Caldwell and Lek Tan, Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War (New York, 1973), pp. 417ff. Sar identified himself as a “professor.”

16 On Pol Pot’s speaking style, see author’s interviews with Richard Dudman (April 1991) and Soth Polin. As François Ponchaud has written, “Content was less important [in Communist sermons] than harmony of effect” (Jackson, ed., Cambodia, 1975—1978, p. 158). When Serge Thion visited the special zone in 1972, a Buddhist monk sympathetic to the party told him: “Religion is teaching. Teaching cannot disappear.” The pedagogical thrust of Theravada Buddhism, and the notion that people can remake themselves by working to become enlightened, played into the hands of cadre, many of whom had been trained as monks or novices to believe in the efficacy of teaching and in the possibility, through study, of personal transformation. See Kiernan and Thion, Khmers rouges! p. 95. When he spoke to Yugoslavian journalists in 1978, Pol Pot took pains to leave the (false) impression that he had spent several years as a Buddhist monk.