17 See Porter, “Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea,” pp. 57-98. Son Ngoc Minh, the titular head of the Cambodian Communist movement, died in December 1972 in Beijing, where he had been taken for medical treatment. His death loosened the links between the Cambodian Communists and Hanoi.

18 See Donald Kirk, “Cambodia 1973: Year of the Bomb Halt,” Asian Survey (1974): 89-100; Shawcross, Sideshow, pp. 261-262; Becker, When the War Was Over, pp. 161ff. In a speech honoring the ninth anniversary of the Revolutionary Army in 1977, a CPK spokesman said that “had we stopped fighting [even] for a month, the enemy would have been able to catch his breath and strengthen his forces” (Tung Padevat [December 1976—January 1977]).

19 Livre noir, pp. 66ff., claims that last-minute pressure was applied by the Vietnamese on Saloth Sar in January 1973, paralleling U.S. pressures on Lon Nol. See also Chea, “Statement of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to the Communist Workers’ Party of Denmark, July 1978,” pp. 21-36. On page 23, Nuon Chea echoed the 1977 speech cited above.

20 See von Marschal, War in Cambodia, pp. 117ff; and Interrogation Report 058/74 (Phan Van Tay), March 1974, Pike Archives (Cambodia, April 1974), which catalogs disagreements in dombon 25. The dismantling of a parallel Cambodian Communist apparatus in Vietnam may have been interpreted by some Cambodians there and by some returnees as another Vietnamese betrayal, as Kiernan suggested in HPP, p. 359.

21 See Georges Boudarel, “La liquidation des communistes cambodgiens formés au Vietnam,” Problèmes politiques et sociaux 373 (1979): 4-7; Kiernan, HPP, pp. 335ff.; Keo Moni’s confession; confessions of Kol Thai (Vong) (January 1976); and author’s interview with Ith Sarin (October 1988). See also U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, Airgram A-179, “Conversations with Khmer Rouge Rallier Ieng Lim,” November 20, 1971, and Airgram A-146, “Khmer Rouge Rallier Kum San,” September 12, 1972. The extent of the purges before 1975 may not have been thorough. Chou Chet’s confession reports that in “late 1976” there were still ”about 100” returnees working in the southwestern zone office. Others, like Men Tul (Sat), retained their posts through 1977—1978, when they were purged. Still others, impossible to identify, undoubtedly covered their tracks and survived the entire period.

22 See Kenneth Quinn, “Political Change in Wartime,” Naval War College Review 28 (Spring 1976): 3—31. His prescient report, originally a State Department airgram (in 1972-1974 Quinn was stationed in Chaudoc, just across the Vietnamese border from Takeo), had little effect on U.S. thinking about the Cambodian Communist movement.

23 On the bombing campaign, see Shawcross, Sideshow, pp. 280ff. and maps on pp. 266—267; Kiernan, HPP, pp. 349ff.; and Ben Kiernan, “The American Bombardment of Kampuchea, 1969-1973,” Vietnam Generation (Winter 1989): 4-41. The arguments Shawcross presented have been disputed in the appendixes to Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, 1982); but see Shawcross, “Additions to the New Edition,” in Sideshow, pp. 409ff., and FBIS, Daily Reports, August 16, 1977, where a speaker asserted that the U.S. bombing campaign had produced “blood rancor, national anger and class indignation.”