Back Brother Number One Save as PDF
Chapters (28)
  1. Title Page
  2. Preface
  3. Acknowledgements
  4. CHAPTER ONE - Introduction
  5. Who Was Pol Pot?
  6. The First Year in Paris
  7. Joining the Viet Minh
  8. CHAPTER FIVE - “Red Khmer,” 1963—1970
  9. CHAPTER SIX - Coming to Power, 1970—1976
  10. CHAPTER SEVEN - Prairie Fire, 1976-1977
  11. Pol Pot in China and North Korea
  12. CHAPTER NINE - “Grandfather 87,” 1979—1998
  13. Chronology
  14. Appendix 1: - Non Suon’s Biography of Pol Pot
  15. Appendix 2: - Khmer Personnel at “Office 100,” 1963—1966
  16. Notes
  17. Chapter One
  18. Chapter Two
  19. Chapter Three
  20. Chapter Four
  21. Chapter Five
  22. Chapter Six
  23. Chapter Seven
  24. Chapter Eight
  25. Chapter Nine
  26. Interviews by Author
  27. Index
  28. Copyright Page

The most far-reaching influence on Saloth Sar, however, was the war being waged in Vietnam. The war had at least three effects on Cambodian political life. One was that Sihanouk, half fearing a Communist victory and half desiring one (for he had come to hate the United States), decided that the way to keep Cambodia out of the war and guarantee its survival was to strike up an alliance with North Vietnam and its surrogate in South Vietnam, the National Liberation Front (NLF). In November 1963 Sihanouk rejected any further U.S. military assistance to his regime. He followed this in 1964 with a secret agreement with the Vietnamese that allowed Vietnamese Communist troops to station themselves on Cambodian soil and to move through the country so long as they respected its inhabitants. In exchange, the Vietnamese promised to honor Cambodia’s independence and its frontiers when the war was over. As the war intensified, the Cambodian bases became crucial to the Vietnamese, and in late 1966 arms from China began flowing to their forces via the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville (Kompong Som). Thus, in trying to outsmart larger powers and sidestep the conflict, Sihanouk compromised his neutrality and guaranteed that Cambodia would be dragged into the war.

A second effect of the war, and a by-product of Sihanouk’s arrangements, was that Cambodian Communists were called by the Vietnamese to provide military and logistical support. Several hundred Khmer Communists traveled to North Vietnam, without Sihanouk’s knowledge, for military and political training.

The third effect of the war was a growing malaise among Cambodia’s elite. By the late 1960s, they were nervous about Sihanouk’s policies and the possibility that Cambodia would be dragged into the war. Many of their children, pouring through an expanded education system, were also unhappy with the prospect of unemployment after they graduated and with Sihanouk’s style of rule. Some of them were inspired by radical teachers. Sihanouk’s response to the malaise was to crack down on dissidents, a policy that alienated the students even more. By 1969 hundreds of them had left the towns to join the Communist resistance.2

A Hostage of the Vietnamese

In late 1963 a Communist militant spotted Saloth Sar in the eastern Cambodian province of Kompong Cham, not far from the Vietnamese border. By the end of 1964 several colleagues had encountered him in an encampment in that region known by the code name “Office (munthi) 100.” One text locates the encampment inside Vietnam; another places it in eastern Kompong Cham. It seems likely that the base moved back and forth across the border in response to military pressures. Saloth Sar remained there until he traveled to Vietnam and China at the end of 1965. These two years, when he accomplished little and depended on people who later became his enemies, marked a low point in his career.