23 See Gary Klintworth, ed., Vietnam’s Withdrawal from Cambodia (Canberra, 1990); Grant Evans and Kelvin Rowley, Red Brotherhood at War, rev. ed. (London, 1990), pp. 301ff.; and Vairon, “Du Partie Indochinois,” pp. 377-381. All Vietnamese troops were withdrawn by 1991, but the Red Khmer faction, and many Cambodians living overseas, suspected that the State of Cambodia was still controlled by “agents” from Vietnam.

24 See, among many works dealing with this period, Michael Doyle, ed., Keeping the Peace (Cambridge, 1997); Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC (Oxford, 1995); and Stephen Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, eds., Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia (Armonk, N.Y, 1996). See also David Ashley, “The End,” Phnom Penh Post, April 24-May 7, 1998.

25 Findlay, Cambodia, p. 60; and Nate Thayer, “Shake-up of Khmer Rouge Hierarchy,” Phnom Penh Post, February 28-March 10, 1994. Son Sen’s dismissal was not publicized at the time. It is possible that the Red Khmer hoped for a royalist victory in the July 1993 elections and a favored place in postelection Cambodia. Such a stance, which underestimated the staying power of Hun Sen’s Cambodian Peoples’ Party (CPP) would explain their failure to disrupt the elections when they took place and their attentiste policy for several months thereafter.

26 Ashley, “The End.”

27 On the radio broadcasts, see Matthew Grainger, “The Voice of Pol Pot,” Phnom Penh Post, April 24-May 7, 1998. Reflecting what may well have been a widespread popular view, a Cambodian told Serge Thion in the early 1990s that “the Vietnamese are most dangerous when they are invisible.”

28 Author’s interview with James Pringle (February 1991). One undated snapshot from the mid-1980s showed Pol Pot and his associates posed in a line; another shows them, uncharacteristically in business suits, posed in a garden in Pyongyang.

29 I have relied here on a map drawn by Roger Normand from defectors’ descriptions of the camp. Over the next seven years, Pol Pot moved (or was moved) frequently.

30 This information is from Roger Normand’s notes; from Peschoux, Euguete; from author’s interview with Peschoux (September 1990); and from transcripts of interviews conducted with former Red Khmer cadre by David Ashley in 1995-1997. In the study sessions, the following topics were discussed: political situation; internal policy; building up military and civil forces; tripartite (coalition) politics; national and socialist viewpoints; virtue, morality, and the origins of the Cambodian nation; review lesson and self-criticism. Other speakers at the sessions included Son Sen, Ta Mok, Khieu Samphan, and Nuon Chea. Of these, Nuon Chea was the least popular, Ta Mok was the most feared, and Son Sen was almost as popular as Pol Pot.

31 Normand, “At the Khmer Rouge School,” p. 200.

32 Peschoux, Enguete, pp. 73-74. In November 1996 a former cadre told David Ashley: “When speaking about an issue, Pol Pot was very good at explaining it in a very clear, lucid way which convinced you that he’d found a complete solution to the problem.” The cadre added: “He speaks slowly, quietly, with a melodious voice.”

33 Normand, “At the Khmer Rouge School,” p. 201.

34 Ibid., p. 202.