13 For the regime’s explanation of Cambodia’s “victory,” see FBIS, Daily Reports, February 2, 1978, which lists the four causes as the Communist party of Kampuchea’s political line; the intrinsic virtues of conducting a people’s war; the unity of the army and the party; and (significantly, in view of what happened later in 1978) “because we have conducted a vigorous, profound revolution [purge] in the ranks of the Party and the army.” Vietnamese officials were convinced that Cambodia’s break with Vietnam signaled increasing Chinese support for the Cambodians (Chanda, Brother Enemy, pp. 215-216).

14 On Pol Pot’s visit, see R. A. Burgler, The Eyes of the Pineapple: Revolutionary Intellectuals and Terror in Democratic Kampuchea (Saarbrücken, 1990), p. 135, citing Stephen Heder’s unpublished interview with a former cadre. See also Tung Padevat, special issue (December 1977-January 1978): 12: “In the southwest, for every two casualties on our side, the enemy had ten. The situation was similar in the east.”

15 On prisoners, see FEER, March 31 and April 21, 1978; and Chanda, Brother Enemy, p. 215. In April a Polish journalist, Monikja Warnenska, visited a camp holding Cambodian prisoners and wrote: “At first when I saw them with chalk in their hands and their faces turning toward a blackboard, I did not understand what was going on. I asked the camp commander, ‘What are they doing?’ The camp commander replied: ‘We are teaching them how to read and write.’ How really strange it is that Cambodian soldiers had to wait until they were taken prisoner to learn the alphabet.” The last word suggests that the prisoners were being taught to read and write in Vietnamese. FBIS, Daily Reports, April 5, 1978. I am grateful to Ms. Warnenska, whose name I misspelled in the first edition, for several interesting letters about her research.

16 Even in this opening-up phase, Pol Pot continued to play hide-and-seek. For example, in an interview broadcast over Radio Phnom Penh on April 12, an announcer read Pol Pot’s replies to questions. On the other hand, every day at 6:00 A.M. an anonymous “spokesman for the Organization” broadcast “Moments of Training” (neati oprum), which contained guidance for cadre and work teams throughout the nation. According to Ong Thong Hoeung (author’s interview, February 1990), who was made to listen to the broadcasts daily, they were delivered by the prime minister himself. Sihanouk, Prisonnier des khmers rouges, p. 219, concurred.

17 Author’s interview with Soth Polin (October 1989); Polin, “La diabolique douceur de Pol Pot”; author’s interview with Keng Vannsak (May 1987).