Agricultural infrastructure received glancing attention. Production of “natural fertilizer” (human and animal waste) was to rise from 5.6 million tons in 1977 to 8.9 million tons in 1980, although how the increase would be accomplished was unstated. Factories were expected to come into being to produce several thousand irrigation pumps. Where the material to make the pumps would come from or how the funding and labor were to be acquired was not specified. Another table notes that in 1979 Cambodia would “buy a factory that produces DDT,” although how this would be accomplished or paid for is not mentioned. Similarly, there were references to the urgency of expanding numbers of draught animals and other livestock and to increasing fisheries, with little attention paid to financing, manpower requirements, veterinary medicine, or the minimization of risk. Pol Pot’s idée fixe was rice: “If we have rice, we have everything,” Radio Phnom Penh had said as early as May 1975. The impression one gets from reading the plan is its faith in revolutionary zeal. Weighed against the plan’s disastrous results, this “zeal” might be seen as synonymous with amateurism, ignorance, and wishful thinking.13

The plan then dealt with proposed industrial and technological developments. Light industry, to be financed by agricultural exports, was to come first. The plan said little about what products would be favored or where the raw materials or labor force would come from. Instead, it suggested that industries be established “producing goods for everyday use, such as ... clothing, mosquito nets, blankets, mats, shoes, hats, tables, cupboards, chairs, plates, pots, pans, spoons, water bowls, pitchers, ... cups, toothbrushes, toothpaste, combs, scissors, soap, towels, medical equipment, muslin, cotton wool, alcohol, knives, axes, sickles, ploughs, tailoring, leather, etc.” (emphasis added). These jumbled “industries” were scheduled to produce “60 to 100 percent” by 1980. No priorities or allocations of resources were mentioned.