“Exactly.” Rimona walked over to the map. “Landesmann’s operation is much like the Iranian nuclear program it serves. It’s dispersed, well concealed, and it contains redundancies and backups. Best of all, Saint Martin is completely untouchable because the entire supply chain is based on dual-use technology that’s sold through cutouts. Martin is far too smart to sell the centrifuge cascades directly to the Iranians. Instead, he sells bits and pieces to XTE Hardware and Equipment. The Chinese then sell the finished product to trading companies in Dubai and Malaysia, which in turn deliver it to Iran.”

“Can you tell how long it has been going on?” asked Cynthia Scarborough of the NSC.

“Not precisely, but we can make an educated guess. We know that Landesmann purchased Keppler Werk in 2002 and started adding other European industrial technology firms to his secret portfolio soon after.”

“So we’re talking about years then,” Scarborough said.

“Several years,” replied Rimona.

“Which means it’s possible the secret chain of enrichment facilities could be at least partially completed?”

“That’s our assumption. And recent Iranian behavior would seem to support that position.”

“What sort of behavior?”

“For one thing, they’re tunneling like moles. Your own satellite photographs show the Iranians are moving more and more of their nuclear program underground. And not just at Qom. They’ve added tunnel complexes at Isfahan and Natanz, and they’re working on new ones at several other sites, including Metfaz, Khojir, and Parchin. Drilling tunnels into mountainsides isn’t easy. And it certainly isn’t cheap. We believe they’re doing it for an obvious reason—to hide plants and to protect them from attack.”

“What else?” asked Shepard Cantwell of the CIA.

“Natanz,” replied Rimona.

“What about Natanz?”

“The Iranians have moved forty-three hundred pounds of low-enriched uranium, virtually their entire stockpile, to an aboveground storage facility. It’s almost as if they’re taunting us to attack them. Why would they take such a risk?”

“I suspect you have a theory.”

“Iran’s economy is on life support. Its young people are so restless they’re willing to die protesting in the streets. We believe the mullahs might actually welcome an attack in order to reestablish their legitimacy with the Iranian people.”

“But are they really willing to give up two tons of low-enriched uranium in the process?”

“They might be if other secret facilities are spinning away. In that case, an attack on Natanz gives them an excuse to throw out the UN inspectors and renounce their participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

“Which would then allow them to pursue a nuclear arsenal openly,” Cynthia Scarborough pointed out. “Just like the North Koreans.”

“That’s correct, Ms. Scarborough.”

“So what are you recommending?”

Rimona switched off the PowerPoint. “Stopping them, of course.”

CHAPTER 57

57

THE PLAINS, VIRGINIA