Chapters (90)
- PROLOGUE
- PART ONE: PROVENANCE
- CHAPTER 1
- CHAPTER 2
- CHAPTER 3
- CHAPTER 4
- CHAPTER 5
- CHAPTER 6
- CHAPTER 7
- CHAPTER 8
- CHAPTER 9
- CHAPTER 10
- CHAPTER 11
- CHAPTER 12
- CHAPTER 13
- CHAPTER 14
- CHAPTER 15
- CHAPTER 16
- CHAPTER 17
- CHAPTER 18
- CHAPTER 19
- CHAPTER 20
- CHAPTER 21
- CHAPTER 22
- PART TWO: ATTRIBUTION
- CHAPTER 23
- CHAPTER 24
- CHAPTER 25
- CHAPTER 26
- CHAPTER 27
- CHAPTER 28
- CHAPTER 29
- CHAPTER 30
- CHAPTER 31
- CHAPTER 32
- CHAPTER 33
- CHAPTER 34
- CHAPTER 35
- CHAPTER 36
- CHAPTER 37
- CHAPTER 38
- CHAPTER 39
- CHAPTER 40
- CHAPTER 41
- PART THREE: AUTHENTICATION
- CHAPTER 42
- CHAPTER 43
- CHAPTER 44
- CHAPTER 45
- CHAPTER 46
- CHAPTER 47
- CHAPTER 48
- CHAPTER 49
- CHAPTER 50
- CHAPTER 51
- CHAPTER 52
- CHAPTER 53
- CHAPTER 54
- CHAPTER 55
- PART FOUR: UNVEILING
- CHAPTER 56
- CHAPTER 57
- CHAPTER 58
- CHAPTER 59
- CHAPTER 60
- CHAPTER 61
- CHAPTER 62
- CHAPTER 63
- CHAPTER 64
- CHAPTER 65
- CHAPTER 66
- CHAPTER 67
- CHAPTER 68
- CHAPTER 69
- CHAPTER 70
- CHAPTER 71
- CHAPTER 72
- CHAPTER 73
- CHAPTER 74
- CHAPTER 75
- CHAPTER 76
- PART FIVE: RECOVERY
- CHAPTER 77
- CHAPTER 78
- CHAPTER 79
- CHAPTER 80
- CHAPTER 81
- AUTHOR’S NOTE
- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
- ABOUT THE AUTHOR
It was Tom Walker, Rimona’s counterpart from the Agency, who answered. “Then Iran could produce enough enriched uranium to build an effective nuclear arsenal in a matter of months. They could throw the nuclear inspectors out of the country and go for nuclear breakout. And if the chain of secret facilities is well hidden and fortified, there would be almost nothing we could do to stop them.”
“Correct,” said Rimona. “But what if those centrifuges aren’t wobbly, unreliable pieces of junk like the IR-1? What if they’re similar to the P-2 models used by Pakistan? Or even better than the P-2? What if they’re European designed and calibrated to the highest standards? What if they’re manufactured under conditions where they don’t end up with bothersome impurities like dust and fingerprints?”
This time it was Adrian Carter who answered. “Then we would be staring down the barrel of a nuclear Iran in a very short period of time.”
“That’s also correct. And I’m afraid that’s exactly what’s happened. While the civilized world has been talking, dithering, delaying, and wringing its hands, the Iranians have been quietly working to achieve their long-held nuclear ambitions. They’ve engaged in the time-honored deceptive practices of khod’eh and taqiyya. They’ve bluffed, deceived, and stalled their way to the doorstep of a nuclear arsenal. And Martin Landesmann has been helping them every step of the way. He’s not just selling the Iranians the centrifuges. He’s selling them the critical pumps, valves, and vacuums that link the centrifuges into a cascade. In short, Martin Landesmann is supplying the Islamic Republic of Iran with everything it needs to build uranium-enrichment plants.”
“How?” asked Adrian Carter.
“Like this,” said Rimona.
THE NEXT MAP that appeared on the screen depicted the Eurasian landmass stretching from Western Europe to the Sea of Japan. Scattered across Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Belgium was a constellation of companies, more than a dozen industrial and technological firms, including Keppler Werk GmbH of Magdeburg. All the firms were connected by dotted lines leading to the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen, headquarters of XTE Hardware and Equipment.
“And guess who owns XTE Hardware and Equipment?” asked Rimona of no one in particular.
“Global Vision Investments,” replied Adrian Carter.
“Through many fronts and subsidiaries, of course,” Rimona added with a sardonic smile. “Mr. Landesmann also has a powerful partner, a Chinese private equity firm based in Shanghai that we believe is nothing more than a front company for the Ministry of State Security.”
“The Chinese intelligence service,” murmured Steven Clark of the FBI.