Back Every Man a Tiger
Chapters (25)
  1. Title Page
  2. Dedication
  3. Introduction
  4. I - Into the Wild Blue
  5. Chapter 1 - Every Man a Tiger
  6. Chapter 2 - The Big Lie
  7. Chapter 3 - The Vision of Bill Creech
  8. II - Shield in the Sky
  9. Chapter 4 - Mission to Jeddah
  10. Chapter 5 - CENTCOM Forward
  11. Chapter 6 - Planning the Storm
  12. Chapter 7 - Band of Brothers and Sisters
  13. III - The Thousand-Hour War
  14. Chapter 8 - Storm!
  15. Chapter 9 - Hits and Misses
  16. Chapter 10 - Lost and Found
  17. Chapter 11 - Punch and Counterpunch
  18. Chapter 12 - A Day in the War
  19. Chapter 13 - The Ten Percent War
  20. Chapter 14 - Shock and Awe
  21. Chapter 15 - Building Coalitions
  22. Chapter 16 - Beyond Iraqi Freedom
  23. Acknowledgements
  24. BIBLIOGRAPHY
  25. INDEX

Did all of this make a real difference? In some ways, yes. Flying became safer for U.S. pilots. They had better targets—steel mills, bridges in Hanoi, SAM storage areas, and other targets in Hanoi and Haiphong. Later they had a few precision, laser-guided bombs, which also helped. Later still, Richard Nixon’s Linebacker II campaign late in 1972 sent B-52s over Hanoi, and mined Haiphong Harbor. The B-52s put terror into the North Vietnamese as no previous U.S. effort had done, and gave notice to the Russians and Chinese that nothing in North Vietnam was immune to U.S. bombing.

But did any of this make a real difference? Obviously no.

LAST RITES

The war in Vietnam had many unexpected consequences, and many of them were surprisingly positive. Here, in his words, is how the war ended for Chuck Horner:

In 1974, I traveled to Saigon and Australia, by then a lieutenant colonel in the Pentagon. While there, I had studied the 1973 Middle East war in detail. Based on this experience and my experience in Vietnam, I had put together a briefing (containing lots of Israeli gunnery film) on air-to-air combat for presentation to Congress. This briefing led to an invitation to a fighter symposium in Australia. As a courtesy, I visited the Vietnam squadrons flying the F-5 to provide them an update.

Not much was going on in Vietnam in those days. The Vietcong, of course, had been wiped out during the Tet Offensive, and we had pretty much pulled out, though there were USAF units in Thailand that could defeat any major action. So the North Vietnamese just sat tight, concentrated on diplomacy, and waited for the United States to lose interest in the South Vietnamese.

While I was in Saigon, the VNAF officers I was meeting knew we had pulled out for good and they were on their own. Therefore, having taken lessons from us for the past several years, they were putting their faith in hardware: if they had more, they would be OK. So they spent their time with me begging for matériel, radars, aircraft, bombs, transport, etc. By then I was aware that they weren’t going to get most of what they were asking for. I also knew that the Congress had had enough of the war and that the next two squadrons of F-5Es scheduled to go to Vietnam were not going to be delivered. The Pentagon had already started action to use them in building an upgraded Aggressor squadrons force at Nellis.