Chapters (28)
- Title Page
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- CHAPTER ONE - Introduction
- Who Was Pol Pot?
- The First Year in Paris
- Joining the Viet Minh
- CHAPTER FIVE - “Red Khmer,” 1963—1970
- CHAPTER SIX - Coming to Power, 1970—1976
- CHAPTER SEVEN - Prairie Fire, 1976-1977
- Pol Pot in China and North Korea
- CHAPTER NINE - “Grandfather 87,” 1979—1998
- Chronology
- Appendix 1: - Non Suon’s Biography of Pol Pot
- Appendix 2: - Khmer Personnel at “Office 100,” 1963—1966
- Notes
- Chapter One
- Chapter Two
- Chapter Three
- Chapter Four
- Chapter Five
- Chapter Six
- Chapter Seven
- Chapter Eight
- Chapter Nine
- Interviews by Author
- Index
- Copyright Page
The U.S.-South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in April-May 1970, which brought Cambodia to the attention of television viewers in the United States and set in motion waves of antiwar sentiment there, encouraged Cambodian Communists to increase their anti-American propaganda. The dependence of the Lon Nol regime on the Americans for military equipment and political support played into the Communists’ hands. Many noncommunists, particularly in the cities, on the other hand, saw the conflict as stemming from an earlier North Vietnamese invasion of their country. Thousands of young men volunteered for Lon Nol’s forces, naively hoping to liberate Cambodia in a few weeks. Hundreds of them were soon killed or wounded. In October 1970 Lon Nol renamed the country the Khmer Republic, ending perhaps two thousand years of monarchic rule. Fighting between his government and the Communists continued for another four-and-a-half years.
Against this background, the Red Khmer moved their headquarters closer to the Vietnamese central command, near Phnom Santhuk on the Kratie-Kompong Thom border. Soon after, Sar summoned cadre from other parts of the country for a study session coinciding with the party’s nineteenth anniversary. This session clarified the roles to be played by cadre and discussed the party’s alliance with North Vietnam.
A document captured in Kratie that probably emanated from the session consists of notes on such topics as “revolutionary ethics,” “short-term strategies,” and “solidarity with Vietnam.” Under the heading “A Diagram of the Revolution,” the document states confusingly that “the revolutionists are in the middle. The revolutionary organizations are behind the revolutionists; and the masses surround the organizations.” What the passage probably meant was that the party apparatus—Saloth Sar and his immediate colleagues—were hidden, powerful, and protected. A subsequent section titled “Conduct of a Revolutionist” notes: “A revolutionist should be kind and sympathetic to the people; a revolutionist should always use kind words when talking to the people. These words should cause no harm; make the listeners sympathetic to the speaker; sound polite in all circumstances; be pleasing to everyone; and make the listeners happy.” It is tempting to think that these suggestions came from Saloth Sar, whose mannerisms they appear to describe. 8
The next month, according to the Livre noir, Saloth Sar and Nuon Chea were summoned by the Vietnamese Communist high command to discuss “the problem of the development of solidarity and cooperation.” These discussions, which allegedly took the form of Vietnamese demands, lasted a week. According to the Livre noir, the two Cambodians proudly rejected further Vietnamese aid.9