Once again, the Livre noir’s account is upside down. In 1970 the Vietnamese increased their support of the Cambodian Communists and were instrumental in eliminating Lon Nol’s army as a military force. Through the distorting lenses of the Livre noir it is clear nonetheless that by the middle of 1971, if not before, the Red Khmer leaders had grown resentful of Vietnamese advice and their own dependence. Since they were in no position to express these feelings, they continued to mask them. Occasional impromptu clashes had already taken place between Red Khmer and Vietnamese forces, but the former still needed Vietnamese military help and technical assistance. Moreover, the Vietnamese were still much stronger than the Red Khmer and in no hurry to go away.

The National Democratic Revolution

Most of the fighting against Lon Nol in 1971-1972 was carried out by Vietnamese forces or by Cambodians under Vietnamese command. In the process, the Cambodian Communist forces became larger, better organized, and more self-confident than before. In July 1971 a “party school session for the entire country” summoned sixty-odd cadre to the party’s headquarters in “the forest in the Northern Zone.” Saloth Sar presided over the meeting, which elected an enlarged Central Committee and proclaimed that the Cambodian Communist party had entered a new phase in its history—namely, a national democratic revolution to overthrow feudalism and imperialism.

The meeting provided a forum where the Red Khmer leaders could demonstrate their control over the party and the resistance. Some of the new policies were spelled out later in the year in the party’s theoretical journal. The meandering text dealt with the history of “building the party” since 1963, when Saloth Sar had become secretary of the Central Committee. Without mentioning Vietnam, the text noted that the revolution must “be appropriate for our country” and that the party’s leaders, also unnamed, were to command “all aspects of the revolution.” Delegates later claimed that speeches at the meeting urged rapid collectivization and attacked the Vietnamese. Refugees fleeing southwestern Cambodia into South Vietnam in 1972-1974 reported that beginning in late 1971 more emphasis had been placed by cadre inside Cambodia on “self-reliance” and “Cambodia for the Cambodians.”10

That Sar could assemble cadre from so many places (Hu Nim and Chou Chet, for example, traveled up from the southwest) suggests that he did not feel threatened by Lon Nol’s forces. While the meeting was going on, however, Lon Nol launched an ambitious, though poorly executed, offensive known as “Chenla II,” and “all cadres, especially in the military sector, hurried off to fight the enemy.” By December 1971 the offensive had collapsed and Lon Nol’s forces had been routed. Most of the damage was inflicted by Vietnamese units. After the defeat, Lon Nol’s army went on the defensive, freeing the Red Khmer to concentrate on social policies, recruitment, and training.

Several Communist documents written after Chenla II asserted that the Cambodian Communists were winning the war on their own. At a training session in December 1971, for example, a spokesman (perhaps Sar himself) remarked,