Back Brother Number One
Chapters (28)
  1. Title Page
  2. Preface
  3. Acknowledgements
  4. CHAPTER ONE - Introduction
  5. Who Was Pol Pot?
  6. The First Year in Paris
  7. Joining the Viet Minh
  8. CHAPTER FIVE - “Red Khmer,” 1963—1970
  9. CHAPTER SIX - Coming to Power, 1970—1976
  10. CHAPTER SEVEN - Prairie Fire, 1976-1977
  11. Pol Pot in China and North Korea
  12. CHAPTER NINE - “Grandfather 87,” 1979—1998
  13. Chronology
  14. Appendix 1: - Non Suon’s Biography of Pol Pot
  15. Appendix 2: - Khmer Personnel at “Office 100,” 1963—1966
  16. Notes
  17. Chapter One
  18. Chapter Two
  19. Chapter Three
  20. Chapter Four
  21. Chapter Five
  22. Chapter Six
  23. Chapter Seven
  24. Chapter Eight
  25. Chapter Nine
  26. Interviews by Author
  27. Index
  28. Copyright Page

Soon after, following a Central Committee meeting, DK radio announced that Pol Pot had resigned as prime minister and had turned the job over to Khieu Samphan. Although the rationale for the changes was not announced, it seems likely that they responded to public relations imperatives. Having Pol Pot out in the open was a liability. Until 1997, after he had fallen from power, he granted no further interviews to the press. Efforts by journalists over the years to talk to him or to take his picture were unsuccessful. In 1990 an American television network, through Thai intermediaries, offered Pol Pot $300,000 for an interview. He refused.11

In a talk to some of his supporters in Phnom Malai in January 1981, however, Pol Pot seems to have dropped his guard for a moment. One of his supporters, interviewed later in the year, provided this account:

Pol Pot spoke as the representative of the military. He said that he knows that many people in the country hate him and think he’s responsible for the killings. He said that he knows many people died. When he said this he nearly broke down and cried. He said he must accept responsibility because the line was too far to the left, and because he didn’t keep proper track of what was going on. He said he was like the master in a house who didn’t know what the kids were up to, and that he trusted people too much. For example, he allowed [Chhim Samauk] to take care of central committee business for him, Savan to take care of intellectuals, and [Sao Phim] to take care of political education ... These were the people to whom he felt very close, and he trusted them completely. Then in the end ... they made a mess of everything ... They would tell him things that were not true, that everything was fine, but that this person or that was a traitor. In the end they were the real traitors. The major problem had been cadre formed by the Vietnamese.12