22 See Hu Nim’s confession in David Chandler, Ben Kiernan, and Chanthou Boua, eds. and trans., Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976—1977 (New Haven, Conn., 1988), pp. 245ff.; and the confession of An Seng Hen (Chun) (December 1977): “In 1967 our revolutionary movement reached a boiling point throughout the country ... Sihanouk shouted his opposition to the movement on the radio ... government officials everywhere lost their positions.” The fact that these popular intellectuals were unwilling, unable, or forbidden to join their superiors in the northeast had important repercussions. Nuon Chea, in his 1997 history of the CPK, noted that “in 1967 there was a revolt in Samlaut but this movement was not yet ripe (tum) so the party decided to quiet it down first. The people revolted and we contributed (ruom psom) too.” Nuon Chea’s stance is consistent with Communist practice, whereby the party, theoretically infallible, assumes full responsibility only for success.

23 See Kiernan, HPP, pp. 256ff.; the confession of Ruos Mau; author’s interview with In Nath (June 1987); and Debré, Cambodge, pp. 111ff. Phnom Vay Chap was known in Communist circles as a “mountain of heroes” (see Chandler, Kiernan, and Boua, eds. and trans., Pol Pot Plaus the Future, pp. 290-291).

24 See the confession of Muol Sambath (Nhim Ros) and confession of Kong Sopal (Kuu). See also Tung Padevat (August 1975): 36—37: “In March-April 1967 an armed uprising took place in Battambang, brought on by contradictions on a national scale as well as by local contradictions, but the Party ordered that [fighting] cease so as to draw lessons from these contradictions and from this armed struggle.” See also Tung Padevat (December 1976—January 1977): 44: “The Party Center said: ’Desist for a moment. Wait until the struggle can occur on a national scale.‘” Chou Chet’s confession asserts that the uprising occurred “under the impetus of party leaders in the northwest,” suggesting a fissure between party veterans in Battambang and the leadership in the northeast. On Kuu, see Vorn Vet’s confession, p. 18. Kuu survived the DK period but disappeared after 1979 (Steve Heder, personal communication). In the Livre noir, p. 28, Pol Pot asserted that following the Samlaut uprising, the Vietnamese were “overcome with panic”; he added (p. 47) that the Vietnamese told the Red Khmer to stop the armed resistance “after the outbreak at Samlaut.” The party’s orders calling off the resistance may have reflected Vietnamese fears of alienating Sihanouk as well as their own prudence. See captured Red Khmer notebook in Indochina Archives (Douglas Pike Collection), University of California, Berkeley (hereafter Pike Archives), which asserts of Samlaut that “even though victorious, our people agreed to lay down their arms and return to their farmlands.”

25 See Kiernan and Boua, Peasants and Politics, pp. 180-181; Chandler, Tragedy, Chapter 5; Kiernan, HPP, pp. 277ff.; Vorn Vet’s confession; and author’s interview with Sok Chuon (June 1990).

26 Pol Pot, “Long Live the 17th Anniversary,” p. 38.