28 Kiernan, HPP, pp. 268ff.; Kiernan and Boua, Peasants and Politics, pp. 182ff.; and author’s interview with Ty Sophen (February 1989). On Bay Damram, see “Speech by Representative of the Party at the Ninth Anniversary of the Revolutionary Army,” Tung Padevat (December 1976—January 1977): 38-39; and Nuon Chea, “Statement of the CPK to the Communist Worker’s Party of Denmark, July 1978,” Journal of Communist Studies (March 1987): 26ff. Nuon Chea dated the decision to start armed struggle to a “Central Committee meeting” held in January 1968, shortly before the incident at Bay Damram. In his “History,” however, Chea claims to have made the decision with several colleagues in Phnom Penh, without reference to authorities in Ratanakiri. His statement to the Danes fails to mention Samlaut. However, under Democratic Kampuchea the region containing Samlaut and Phnom Vay Chap was named “sector (dombon) 1,” perhaps to honor its revolutionary credentials (see Michael Vickery, Cambodia, 1975—1982 [Boston, 1983], p. 67).

29 On the Bowles visit, see Chandler, Tragedy, Chapter 5; and William Shawcross, Sideshow: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York, 1979), pp. 68-71.

30 On morale issues, Al Santoli (personal communication). See also CIA reports from 1969 (numbers excised) in Pike Archives (Cambodia, 1969); and Kiernan, HPP, pp. 282ff. Nuon Chea’s “History” claims that Red Khmer forces at this time traded chickens for guns with Vietnamese quartered in Cambodia “because the Vietnamese were starving.”

31 See Siet Chhae’s confession.

32 See “Seckdei nai no’m 870” [Guidance from 870], Tung Padevat (January 1972): 12-37. The number ”870” was used to designate the highest authority in the Communist party. See also Nuon Chea, “Statement of the CPK,” p. 22: “We had no weapons to speak of and no aid from the outside.... Sometimes we had weapons but no ammunition. Sometimes even if we had no ammunition we carried weapons so as to frighten the enemy.”

33 See Sok Nhanh’s confession; and “Training Khmers in North Vietnam,” CIA document in Pike Archives (Cambodia, March 1973). See also Kiernan, HPP, p. 280. Keo Meas stayed in Vietnam and China until 1975 and was purged in 1976. In December 1972, Son Ngoc Minh died of an illness in Beijing, where he had been transferred from Hanoi. He was revived as a hero in Cambodia after 1979—an avenue in Phnom Penh was named after him and his portrait appeared on 100-riel notes.

34 See Chandler, Tragedy, Chapter 5; Charles Meyer, Derrière le sourire khmer (Paris, 1971), pp. 283—385; and Martin, Le mal cambodgien, pp. 119ff.

35 On U.S. bombing, see Kiernan, HPP, pp. 285ff. See also “Notebook Entries August to September 1969 by [a Vietnamese] Cadre,” Pike Archives (Cambodia, September 1969); and testimony of Chau Vari So, Pike Archives (Cambodia, January 1974). On the prelude to the coup, see Chandler, Tragedy, Chapter 5.