13 Carney, “Unexpected Victory,” p. 245 (n15). See also Kiernan, HPP, pp. 220ff. As evidence of Sino-Vietnamese collaboration at this time, a Cambodian Communist party member from Hanoi supervised a study session in late 1966 for Cambodians and their “Chinese brothers.”

14 Lin Biao, “Long Live the Victory of the People’s War!” Peking Review, September 3, 1965, p. 22. See also Stuart Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung (Cambridge, U.K., 1989), pp. 171ff.; and Paul J. Hiniker, Revolutionary Ideology and Chinese Reality: Dissonance Under Mao (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1977), pp. 209ff. For a sympathetic account of China at this time, see David Milton and Nancy Dall Milton, The Wind Will Not Subside (New York, 1976), pp. 95ff. On K’ang Sheng, see David Apter and Tony Saich, Revolutionary Discourse (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), pp. 280ff.; John Byron and Robert Pack, The Claws of the Dragon (New York, 1992); Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 3. (Oxford, 1997), pp. 291-294; and Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer, The Chinese Secret Service (London, 1989), which claims (at p. 410), without citing a source, that Pol Pot “took training courses with K‘ang Sheng’s special services in 1965 (sic) and 1969.” See also Hu Yao-ping, “Problems Concerning the Purge of K’ang Sheng,” Issues and Studies (June 1980): 74-100; Michael Schoenhals, “The Central Case Examination Group, 1966-1979,” China Quarterly (March 1996): 87-110; and Michael Schoenhals, “Mao’s Great Inquisition: The Central Case Examination Group, 1966-1979,” special issue of Chinese Law and Government (May-June 1996). The CCEG, functioning throughout the DK period, may well have provided some inspiration for S-21. Until his death, K‘ang Sheng was closely associated with it.

15 Several confessions link the shift of Office 100 to U.S. bombardment.

16 See Chhim Samauk’s confession; and Becker, When the War Was Over, p. 469. See also Sok Knol’s confession and author’s interview with Sok Knol’s brother, Sok Sambath (July 1989).

17 See Robert Cribb, ed., The Indonesian Killings, 1965—1966: Studies from Java and Bali (Clayton, Australia, 1990). The parallels between Sihanouk and Sukarno and between Lon Nol and Suharto were not lost on the major actors.

18 On Red Khmer relations with these tribes, see Becker, When the War Was Over, pp. 122-124; and Siet Chhae’s and Chhim Samauk’s confessions. Siet Chhae commented: “I could see that the national minority youths were very good, working class and natural.” On Communist attitudes, see author’s interviews with Thiounn Mumm (May 1988), Keat Chhon (November 1987), and Ong Thong Hoeung (May 1988).

19 On this period of Pol Pot’s life, see Sara Colm, “Pol Pot: The Secret 60s,” Phnom Penh Post, April 24—May 7, 1998, drawing on extensive interviews. For a list of Pol Pot’s bodyguards in 1977, many of whom were tribal people, see Keat Chau’s confession. On Marx’s view of such an undifferentiated society, see Maurice Bloch, Marxism and Anthropology (Oxford, 1982), pp. 10ff.; and Michael Thompson et al., Cultural Theory (Boulder, Colo., 1990), pp. 147ff. In 1976 Pol Pot’s bodyguard was a tribesman named Thoeun (see Kheang Kim Hon’s confession, p. 10). See also the confession of Ket Chau in 1977, which gives the names of two Tapuon and two Jarai tribesmen who worked as bodyguards for “the Organization” (that is, Pol Pot). See also David Ashley’s interview (September 1997) with Phi Phuon, an ethnic Jarai who served as Saloth Sar’s bodyguard from 1967 to 1975.