Back Brother Number One
Chapters (28)
  1. Title Page
  2. Preface
  3. Acknowledgements
  4. CHAPTER ONE - Introduction
  5. Who Was Pol Pot?
  6. The First Year in Paris
  7. Joining the Viet Minh
  8. CHAPTER FIVE - “Red Khmer,” 1963—1970
  9. CHAPTER SIX - Coming to Power, 1970—1976
  10. CHAPTER SEVEN - Prairie Fire, 1976-1977
  11. Pol Pot in China and North Korea
  12. CHAPTER NINE - “Grandfather 87,” 1979—1998
  13. Chronology
  14. Appendix 1: - Non Suon’s Biography of Pol Pot
  15. Appendix 2: - Khmer Personnel at “Office 100,” 1963—1966
  16. Notes
  17. Chapter One
  18. Chapter Two
  19. Chapter Three
  20. Chapter Four
  21. Chapter Five
  22. Chapter Six
  23. Chapter Seven
  24. Chapter Eight
  25. Chapter Nine
  26. Interviews by Author
  27. Index
  28. Copyright Page

30 Realites cambodgiennes (hereafter RC), October 16, 1959; L’Observateur, October 13, 1959.

31 See George McT. Kahin, Intervention (New York, 1986), pp. 110ff.; and Porter, “Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea,” in Chandler and Kiernan, eds., Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea, pp. 57-98.

32 Pol Pot, “Long Live the 17th Anniversary,” p. 23. In his “History,” Nuon Chea claims to have taken draft statutes of the new party to show to Vietnamese Communist officials in Tay Ninh (South Vietnam) before the September meeting. “The Vietnamese were unhappy,” he wrote thirty-seven years later, “because they saw that we had the ability to raise a strategic-tactical line and make [party] statutes by ourselves.”

33 On Son Ngoc Minh’s attendance at the Vietnamese congress, see U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Communism and Cambodia” (n.d. [probably 1971]), p. 29. Neither Sihanouk’s police nor U.S. intelligence services were aware of the subsequent Cambodian meeting.

34 Pun Than’s confession quotes Keo Meas in 1960 as saying, “We must become a Workers’ Party, like Vietnam.” On regional responsibilities, see Serge Thion’s interview with Ouk Boun Chhoeum (September 1981). See also Thomas Engelbert and Christopher Goscha, Falling Out of Touch: A Study on Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement, 1930—1975 (Clayton, Australia, 1994), which indicates that the program advanced at the 1960 meeting suggested that the party “must also be prepared to adopt a non-peaceful form of struggle”—a phrase that falls short of “armed struggle.”

35 See U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, Airgram, A-93, August 23, 1962; and RC, August 17, 1962, in which Sihanouk is reported as saying that “a few months ago” his intelligence services obtained a message “from Viet Minh authorities, addressed to Cambodian cadres.” The document urged the party not to present candidates for the 1962 election, adding: “Our best interests are served by relying on young intellectuals who sympathize with our movement.” This text, which may have been captured in the raid that resulted in Tou Samouth’s death in July 1962 (see below), might also have been the document “from 1961” referred to in Pol Pot’s anti-Vietnamese polemic, Livre noir, and characterized as ”excelling in confusion“ (see Democratic Kampuchea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Livre noir: Faits et preuves des actes d‘agression ... du Vietnam [Paris, 1978]).

36 See U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, Telegram 471, January 15, 1962, and Telegram 477, January 17, 1962.