U.S. officials saw the conflict in terms of the Sino-Soviet split. On January 8, 1978, U.S. presidential adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski referred to it as a “proxy war” between the USSR and China. In February the Chinese accelerated shipments of military aid to Phnom Penh and stepped up their propaganda against Hanoi. In Vietnam, the government began harassing ethnic Chinese residents and strengthened its alliance with the USSR. The Vietnamese also decided on a political solution to the Cambodian “problem,” a solution that involved encouraging opponents of Pol Pot to revolt against him. They also began training Cambodians in Vietnam to take part in military operations and to form the nucleus of a new regime. By mid-February 1978 Radio Hanoi was referring to Cambodia’s policies as “barbaric,” as reflecting “bigoted nationalism” and “medieval rural thinking.” At this point, it seems, Hanoi’s plans for Cambodia began to resemble the intricate fantasies that Duch and his subordinates at S-21 had been concocting since the middle of 1976.15

Opening Up

Pol Pot’s response to Vietnam’s actions was to seek friends overseas, to welcome visitors to Cambodia, to make cosmetic improvements in people’s standards of living, to grant an ambiguous political amnesty to April 17 people, and to proceed with the extirpation of enemies. His new policies included a more welcoming attitude toward visitors. Between November 1977 and the end of 1978, official delegations arrived from Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Scandinavian countries. A television and news reporting team came in from Yugoslavia, and delegates from pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist parties arrived from several countries, including Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, and the United States. The visitors were taken to see Angkor and selected agricultural sites. Most of them had audiences with Ieng Sary; some had meetings with Nuon Chea and Pol Pot. In addition, greetings were now exchanged by mail between Red Khmer leaders, chiefs of state, and pro-Chinese Communist parties on national days and in response to offers of political support. As part of this opening up, Democratic Kampuchea began publishing materials in French and English as well as in Khmer.

During this period, Pol Pot was more accessible than ever before. In these controlled encounters, he was invariably pleasant but not especially revealing. At the same time, as Pol Pot selected the topics for one set of visitors or another, he revealed a good deal about his preoccupations.16

To a Yugoslavian television team that visited Cambodia for ten days in March, Pol Pot provided a brief biographical statement: “You are the first people to know my biography,” he told them with a smile. Once again, as in his Korean press release, he concealed his palace connections, his real name, and his privileged education, but this time he admitted studying in Europe and working in Yugoslavia. He added that after coming home he had taught “history, geography and civics in a private school.” During that time, he said, “Lon Nol’s police followed my activities. They knew me, but they did not know exactly who I was.” Turning to his policies, he mentioned that “we wish to do away with all vestiges of the past.” His former student from Chamraon Vichea, Soth Polin, at that point driving a taxi in Paris, recognized him at once when the interview was broadcast over French television. So did his old mentor Keng Vannsak. One of the Yugoslavs remarked to a friend that in all the footage they shot, Pol Pot was the only person who was smiling.17