The revolutionaries seem to have divided the “ministries” along prerevolutionary lines, and although eight of the thirteen officials survived in positions of authority in Pol Pot’s movement into the 1990s, five were purged between 1976 and 1978. In other words, Saloth Sar/Pol Pot saw to it that close to a third of his cabinet were executed over the next three years—an indication of the volatility of his years in power. Some of those killed, like Chhim Samauk and Vorn Vet, had been his intimate associates for many years.

The rest of the October 1975 minutes discussed the monitoring role to be played by the standing committee of the party. It underscored the need to “build and defend” (kosang nung kapea) the country, the need to organize a national army, and the desirability of sending people abroad for technical training. Although Vietnam and Thailand were not mentioned, the minutes stressed the importance of guarding Cambodia’s land and sea frontiers against invasion and protecting the party against its enemies.51

Sihanouk’s role within this new government was ambiguous; but as long as the Chinese supported the prince, it was hard for the Red Khmer to move against him. In January 1976, however, Sihanouk’s most enduring patron, the Chinese prime minister, Zhou Enlai, died in Beijing after a long illness. By then, the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea and new statutes for the party had been promulgated, although the new government had not yet taken office. Sihanouk’s position became uncertain.

In early March, the prince submitted his resignation without being asked to do so, and the standing committee met to decide his future. That same day, its members also discussed the problem of the “eastern frontier.” The two documents make interesting reading.52 Khieu Samphan opened the discussion about Sihanouk by saying that the prince had just addressed two letters in French to the “organization.” One proposed that he resign from office for health reasons; the other, addressed to the Cambodian people, dated his resignation from March 20, 1976, the date scheduled for elections to the national deliberative body known as the People’s Representative Assembly.

The prince’s spontaneous gesture, probably aimed at pleasing the Red Khmer, angered their leader, who presumed he was upstaging them. The “Comments from the Organization” that followed Samphan’s remarks offer a rare glimpse of “Brother Pol” with no mandate to be polite. The resignations, Sar said, were meaningless. After all, “Sihanouk isn’t resigning now; he did that already in 1971”—that is, when Ieng Sary had gone to Beijing to supervise the prince. Sar saw two reasons for removing Sihanouk from office. One was ”the class contradiction between him, his wife and the revolution. He can’t live with us.“ The second reason was that the prince’s presence was a continuing embarrassment to the Red Khmer. The party had no need for Sihanouk anymore, Sar said, and the prince himself realized he was ”finished.“ On the other hand, Sar mused, keeping the prince in Phnom Penh could be a way of getting back at the Vietnamese, ”who tell us that we are leftist.“ If Sihanouk departed the country on his own, Sar said, this would ”confuse the Chinese“; but if he stayed, his complaints could be muffled within a month. After all, the prince was a ”patriot,“ Sar maintained, even though his wife was not. Sar proposed that Samphan arrange a meeting with Sihanouk at which he could be praised deceptively and told to withdraw his resignation until it was demanded. It was essential to the party that the prince remain silenced in Phnom Penh.