Chapters (28)
- Title Page
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- CHAPTER ONE - Introduction
- Who Was Pol Pot?
- The First Year in Paris
- Joining the Viet Minh
- CHAPTER FIVE - “Red Khmer,” 1963—1970
- CHAPTER SIX - Coming to Power, 1970—1976
- CHAPTER SEVEN - Prairie Fire, 1976-1977
- Pol Pot in China and North Korea
- CHAPTER NINE - “Grandfather 87,” 1979—1998
- Chronology
- Appendix 1: - Non Suon’s Biography of Pol Pot
- Appendix 2: - Khmer Personnel at “Office 100,” 1963—1966
- Notes
- Chapter One
- Chapter Two
- Chapter Three
- Chapter Four
- Chapter Five
- Chapter Six
- Chapter Seven
- Chapter Eight
- Chapter Nine
- Interviews by Author
- Index
- Copyright Page
The Vietnamese had good reason to be conciliatory: Cambodian units had attacked and occupied several Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Thailand in April and May 1975, perhaps as part of an effort to revise Cambodia’s maritime boundaries and lay claim to the oil deposits offshore. The Vietnamese, who had retaliated by occupying at least one Cambodian island, were unwilling to make territorial concessions to the Khmer, but they did not relish an outright confrontation.45
In August 1975 Saloth Sar, accompanied by a small entourage, visited a former military workshop west of Phnom Penh. The machinery there was being serviced by former Republican army engineers and some Sino-Khmer artisans—all April 17 people—recruited soon after liberation because of their experience and skills. This recruitment policy remained in effect for several months. One of the artisans recalled the visit vividly in 1989:
Saloth Sar came into the workplace and asked us to gather round. He asked us if we had any ideas about making new machines, designing them ourselves. He said that because in Cambodia we had an outdated technology, we hadn’t yet made new machines. Besides, no one in previous societies could invent them. His manner was honest and kind-hearted. He spoke slowly; he was a straightforward person. He had a small fan in his hand, and from time to time he opened and turned and closed it, like someone in a Chinese opera. He spoke as he walked back and forth, opening out the fan to fan himself—it was so hot! He would open and close the fan [and point it at us] like this, for emphasis. He wore ordinary black clothes; no tie, no scarf.46
These remarks echo those of people who knew Sar as a teacher. The way Sar presented himself—the slowly uttered words, the fan, the half-closed eyes—seems theatrical and false, with a straightforward, villainous personality lurking behind the surface. To assume this would be a mistake because it ignores the Khmer tradition of unruffled authoritarianism found in Buddhist and secular teaching, which, when added to Saloth Sar/Pol Pot’s apparent warmth, made him so attractive to so many people. His friendly manner and self-control earned him respect and inspired obedience. His recorded statements to small gatherings often sound more brutal than those he made to larger groups, but he never gives the impression that he is raising his voice or losing his equanimity. Thiounn Mumm, who saw him often in this period, described him by quoting G. Axelrod’s characterization of Lenin: “He was a revolutionary twenty-four hours a day, and when he slept, he dreamt about revolution.”47
Inventing Democratic Kampuchea
Revolutionary movements are poorly suited to becoming functioning regimes—the process is painful and contradictory. Revolutionary movements, after all, focus on seizing nations rather than administering them; they are geared toward war. Revolutionaries, for the most part, lack bureaucratic skills and are contemptuous of “government.” These impediments to governing properly did not keep Cambodia’s leaders from thinking that revolutionary fervor and defeating the Americans were better credentials than any experience as civil servants. Their insistence on prolonging combat and maintaining hatred, when combined with their lack of experience, had disastrous consequences.