The flight leader plans the mission, determines the goals to be achieved, briefs the flight, navigates, dictates the tactics, and in general works all the details.

The element lead, or deputy flight lead, backs him up and takes charge if for some reason the lead is unable to maintain the lead (if he loses his radio, crashes, aborts, or is shot down). He also keeps track of navigation, in case the leader gets lost; clears the sky behind numbers one and two aircraft; keeps track of his own wingman, to make sure he is doing his job; and thinks about what he would be doing better if he was the leader.

Number three and number one run the flight and make the decisions about how to attack, what formations to use, and whether or not to penetrate bad weather. It is their job to get the mission done and bring the wingmen home alive.

The wingmen, number two and number four, are the greenest flyers. They are expected to keep their mouths shut unless they are low on fuel, have an emergency, or see an enemy aircraft approaching the flight (especially from behind it)—but only after no one else has called it out.

Though watching over four aircraft is near the limit of any single leader’s abilities, air-to-ground missions will sometimes contain up to sixteen aircraft. This is usually not a problem, as long as nothing goes amiss in the preplanned mission. However, if an enemy fighter somehow works into the middle of a sixteen-ship flight, it will be a chaotic mess, with airplanes all over the place trying to kill the enemy, stay alive, and regain order.

In determining who is to be the flight leader, rank in itself is not an issue. However, since flight leaders are usually the experienced pilots, they are more often than not captains and majors, or—higher still—lieutenant colonels, such as the squadron commander and the ops officer. In Vietnam, however, when the Air Force frequently used nonfighter pilots, the flight leader was often a young lieutenant with sixty to ninety missions under his belt leading around majors and lieutenant colonels who had come from bombers and thus weren’t credible in fighters. (This was one of the many U.S. failures in Vietnam that resulted from the rotation policies: a pilot came home after 100 missions in the North or after a year in the South, and other pilots were rotated in for their chance at combat . . . whether or not they had been trained in fighters, or even—for that matter—in conventional war.)

All young jocks aspire to make leader. Most of the time, they do it by working their way up a complex training regime: first, check rides as element lead, then a few rides with an instructor on the wing as practice lead, and finally a flight-lead check ride. That system isn’t always possible, however. At Lakenheath, for example, there was no established flight-lead check-out program. Instead, the squadron flight commander, operations officer, standardization and evaluation pilot, instructor pilot, or the commander flew with a pilot a few times, looked at his check rides, then just published orders making him a flight leader.