Chapters (60)
- Cover
- Dedication
- Foreword
- Preface
- Prologue
- PART ONE
- Kharkiv, Ukraine
- The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
- Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
- The Kremlin, Moscow
- Washington, D.C.
- Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
- North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
- Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
- Riga, Latvia
- National Defense Control Center, Moscow
- Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
- NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
- Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
- Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
- Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
- Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
- British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
- The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
- HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
- National Defense Control Center, Moscow
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
- Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
- 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
- HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
- Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
- PART TWO
- Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
- The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
- The White House, Washington, D.C.
- NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
- Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
- PART THREE
- “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
- North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
- GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
- Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
- Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
- The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
- Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
- Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
- Over Wroclaw, Poland
- Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
- 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
- Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
- Epilogue
- Glossary
- Acknowledgments
- Notes
“We estimate that in the JOA, the Joint Operational Area, the Russians have got somewhere in the region of three hundred SAMs, organized into over a hundred firing batteries, with approximately five thousand Anti-Aircraft Artillery, supported by hundreds of overlapping early-warning, search-and-acquisition radars,” continued Williams. “That means that, once Rasputin is activated, there’ll need to be a constant flow of allied aircraft pouring over southern Lithuania, Kaliningrad and western Estonia to hit the batteries and other ground assets while the C2 is down. The targeting has been done very precisely and, as long as we achieve surprise, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, the JFACC, will be able to achieve air superiority before the air assault goes in.
“I’m not sure who’ll be more surprised: the Russians when their systems crash, or our flyers when they find they’ve got an open door and no incoming SAMs. Or, let’s put it like this, no coordinated SAM defenses. It’s entirely possible that individual batteries may be able to go into manual override and fire on their own initiative. Which raises a rather juicy prospect.”
“And that is?” asked Howard.
“If it’s an uncoordinated free-for-all up there, which it could be if Rasputin lives up to its name, then the Russians may not dare put their own planes into the air in case they get shot down by their own batteries.”
“That I like!” exclaimed McKinlay. GCHQ had not briefed him on that possibility.
Howard only nodded. “That would be an unexpected bonus. But if Rasputin doesn’t work, then we’ll implement the contingency plan?”
“We’re ready for that, SACEUR. It’ll be a conventional and potentially very attritional campaign. Air Com has a contingency air-tasking order that assumes it will take thirty-six hours to neutralize the Russian Integrated S-400 Air Defense system. When that’s been achieved . . . or not, it’ll be your call. If it’s looking good, it’ll be a case of reinforcing success by letting the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps loose into southern Lithuania and going ahead with the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force landing in Estonia. If not, you can mission-abort at any stage and let the politicians start talking.”
The room was silent. The prospect of mission failure was too grim to contemplate.
“And it could get far worse,” interrupted McKinlay. “There’s a high chance that the Russians will go nuclear.”