Back War with Russia
Chapters (60)
  1. Cover
  2. Dedication
  3. Foreword
  4. Preface
  5. Prologue
  6. PART ONE
  7. Kharkiv, Ukraine
  8. The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
  9. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
  10. Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
  11. The Kremlin, Moscow
  12. Washington, D.C.
  13. Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
  14. North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  15. Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
  16. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  17. Riga, Latvia
  18. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  19. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  20. NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  21. National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
  22. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
  23. Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
  24. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  25. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  26. Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
  27. British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
  28. The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
  29. HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
  30. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  31. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  32. Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
  33. 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
  34. HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
  35. Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
  36. PART TWO
  37. Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
  38. The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
  39. The White House, Washington, D.C.
  40. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
  41. Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
  42. PART THREE
  43. “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
  44. North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  45. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
  46. GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
  47. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  48. Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
  49. The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
  50. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  51. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  52. Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
  53. Over Wroclaw, Poland
  54. Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  55. 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
  56. Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  57. Epilogue
  58. Glossary
  59. Acknowledgments
  60. Notes

“We estimate that in the JOA, the Joint Operational Area, the Russians have got somewhere in the region of three hundred SAMs, organized into over a hundred firing batteries, with approximately five thousand Anti-Aircraft Artillery, supported by hundreds of overlapping early-warning, search-and-acquisition radars,” continued Williams. “That means that, once Rasputin is activated, there’ll need to be a constant flow of allied aircraft pouring over southern Lithuania, Kaliningrad and western Estonia to hit the batteries and other ground assets while the C2 is down. The targeting has been done very precisely and, as long as we achieve surprise, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, the JFACC, will be able to achieve air superiority before the air assault goes in.

“I’m not sure who’ll be more surprised: the Russians when their systems crash, or our flyers when they find they’ve got an open door and no incoming SAMs. Or, let’s put it like this, no coordinated SAM defenses. It’s entirely possible that individual batteries may be able to go into manual override and fire on their own initiative. Which raises a rather juicy prospect.”

“And that is?” asked Howard.

“If it’s an uncoordinated free-for-all up there, which it could be if Rasputin lives up to its name, then the Russians may not dare put their own planes into the air in case they get shot down by their own batteries.”

“That I like!” exclaimed McKinlay. GCHQ had not briefed him on that possibility.

Howard only nodded. “That would be an unexpected bonus. But if Rasputin doesn’t work, then we’ll implement the contingency plan?”

“We’re ready for that, SACEUR. It’ll be a conventional and potentially very attritional campaign. Air Com has a contingency air-tasking order that assumes it will take thirty-six hours to neutralize the Russian Integrated S-400 Air Defense system. When that’s been achieved . . . or not, it’ll be your call. If it’s looking good, it’ll be a case of reinforcing success by letting the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps loose into southern Lithuania and going ahead with the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force landing in Estonia. If not, you can mission-abort at any stage and let the politicians start talking.”

The room was silent. The prospect of mission failure was too grim to contemplate.

“And it could get far worse,” interrupted McKinlay. “There’s a high chance that the Russians will go nuclear.”