Howard continued. “But the bottom line is this. I’m counting on surprise and concentration of force in one massive attack by air, and Tomahawk missiles from the sea, to neutralize the Russian capability. And, of course, the key to it all is when the Brits activate Rasputin. The Russians won’t know what the hell is happening. Except that there will be a total collapse of their integrated air-defense system, as well as their nuclear and other command and control systems.”

“We know that, Sir. But the problem is Com Air, the Air Commander, at Ramstein doesn’t. He thinks he is putting his people into a suicide mission,” pointed out Williams. “In fact, ‘taken leave of our senses’ was one of the milder expressions he used. Couldn’t we . . . ?”

“Skip, I get it,” Howard interrupted. “I’ve spoken to him. We’re old buddies. But rightly, the Brits are keeping the circle of those in the know ultra-tight. God forbid, but they may need to use Rasputin again in the future, so we have to keep its very existence contained. I’ll have another word with him to reassure him . . . And of course it’s tough for those flyers. But that’s the way it’s got to be.”

The direction for McKinlay had been very clear—only Howard and Williams were cleared to be briefed about Rasputin and the circle was not to be widened. Even the SHAPE Chief of Staff, General Klaus Wittman, a German, was not being brought into the secret. But under the so-called “two eyes” protocol, such sensitive intelligence could only be shared between the British and Americans, and then only those with an absolute need to know. Such restrictions created real resentment in an Alliance where shared endeavor was a fundamental principle; particularly for the French, who complained bitterly about this privileged Anglo-Saxon club.

“We need to move on, Skip. Run me through the sequence again.”

Williams pressed the switch on the remote control and ran through a series of briefing slides. Once Rasputin had been activated by a phone call from McKinlay to GCHQ direct, the window of opportunity was uncertain. The briefing at GCHQ from Allenby had been very clear and had not changed: Rasputin would have a devastating impact on all Russian command and control systems, integrated air-defense and nuclear included, but it was uncertain how long it would be sustainable.

The most GCHQ felt able to guarantee was an eight-hour window—and even that was assuming an hour or two of confusion while the Russians worked through what was happening in the middle of the night and then started to fix the bug—after which the Russians would regain control of both their air-defense and nuclear systems. Hence the critical importance of the short, sharp operation to suppress Russian air defenses.