Back War with Russia Save as PDF
Chapters (60)
  1. Cover
  2. Dedication
  3. Foreword
  4. Preface
  5. Prologue
  6. PART ONE
  7. Kharkiv, Ukraine
  8. The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
  9. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
  10. Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
  11. The Kremlin, Moscow
  12. Washington, D.C.
  13. Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
  14. North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  15. Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
  16. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  17. Riga, Latvia
  18. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  19. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  20. NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  21. National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
  22. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
  23. Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
  24. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  25. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  26. Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
  27. British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
  28. The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
  29. HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
  30. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  31. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  32. Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
  33. 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
  34. HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
  35. Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
  36. PART TWO
  37. Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
  38. The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
  39. The White House, Washington, D.C.
  40. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
  41. Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
  42. PART THREE
  43. “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
  44. North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  45. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
  46. GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
  47. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  48. Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
  49. The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
  50. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  51. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  52. Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
  53. Over Wroclaw, Poland
  54. Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  55. 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
  56. Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  57. Epilogue
  58. Glossary
  59. Acknowledgments
  60. Notes

“But there’s more to it than that. Despite the President and the Defense Minister having their own suitcase for command and control, actual physical control of the unlock and launch authorization codes resides with the military. In fact, the General Staff has direct access to these codes and can initiate a missile launch with or without permission of the political authorities.”

“So, if we captured the launch sites and the command posts, would we be able to take control of the missiles?”

“The million-dollar question, ma’am. We believe we can take control, but I will explain it at the end, so please bear with me. First though, while the Russians are focused on our main forces approaching the Baltics, 82nd Airborne will sneak in and secure the Kaliningrad launch sites. Meanwhile, our Special Forces will capture the command bunker from which all the sites are controlled. Once we’ve got them secured, we’ll redirect the missiles at the Russians. They’ll be bound to be threatening us once they realize what we’ve done, but we’ll be able to threaten them back. And with their own missiles. I can’t imagine the Russian people will exactly appreciate that scenario, especially once it’s all over social media, which we will ensure it is the moment it happens.”

Dillon leaned back and as she thought through the consequences and how it would work out politically, she began to smile. “If the President became a laughing stock after what the Latvians did to him in the forest, how much greater a humiliation this would be . . .”

Then her face hardened again. “But how many launch sites are there? How many missiles? And what do we have to put on the ground to grab them?”

McCann was ready for these questions. “We believe the Russians have got one hundred nuclear-armed Iskander missiles. Next slide please.” On the screen a high-resolution image of Kaliningrad appeared. “They’re on mobile launchers, but deployed at three protected launch sites.” And again, he directed his laser pointer at the screen. “Here, at Pravdinsk, Yuzhnyy and Ozërsk—with all the sites controlled from the command set-up at Pravdinksk—that’s here, in the center. As for numbers of our people. We’ll need to insert Special Forces, specially trained to adjust the missiles electronically, but also to act as pathfinders for the main force. They’ll be followed by an air assault force at each launch site to break in and secure the missiles.”

“How will you stop the Russians counter-attacking?” quizzed the President.