Back War with Russia Save as PDF
Chapters (60)
  1. Cover
  2. Dedication
  3. Foreword
  4. Preface
  5. Prologue
  6. PART ONE
  7. Kharkiv, Ukraine
  8. The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
  9. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
  10. Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
  11. The Kremlin, Moscow
  12. Washington, D.C.
  13. Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
  14. North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  15. Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
  16. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  17. Riga, Latvia
  18. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  19. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  20. NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  21. National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
  22. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
  23. Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
  24. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  25. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  26. Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
  27. British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
  28. The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
  29. HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
  30. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  31. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  32. Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
  33. 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
  34. HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
  35. Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
  36. PART TWO
  37. Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
  38. The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
  39. The White House, Washington, D.C.
  40. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
  41. Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
  42. PART THREE
  43. “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
  44. North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  45. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
  46. GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
  47. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  48. Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
  49. The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
  50. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  51. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  52. Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
  53. Over Wroclaw, Poland
  54. Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  55. 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
  56. Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  57. Epilogue
  58. Glossary
  59. Acknowledgments
  60. Notes

“Iskander . . . or our Tomahawks for that matter, are tactical in that they can be moved around easily. The Iskanders in Kaliningrad are mounted on vehicles. You’ll have seen shots of them driving past the saluting stand at their May Day Parade in Moscow. They are smaller and have a much shorter range than an ICBM, but as I said, it is pretty academic once they start flying. They can carry a normal warhead or a nuclear one—again like our Tomahawks. And, like our Tomahawks, they are extremely accurate and difficult to knock down. But the key thing to remember is that even the smallest one of these is many, many times more powerful than the ones we dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Just imagine that mushroom cloud, magnified many times over, exploding over the cities of Western Europe.”

McCann looked around him and, although Bear knew the horrendous statistics, he found himself almost unable to breathe with the magnitude of what was being described.

Satisfied that he had made his message clear, McCann continued, “Now, the point for us here today is that the Russians moved these nuclear Iskanders to Kaliningrad to threaten NATO and destabilize the Baltics. Which they have certainly succeeded in doing. But that also means that, unlike their nuclear missile subs, which are hidden at sea, or their ICBMs, which are dug in far behind their borders where we cannot get to them, we could get at these. It is the fact that they are mobile that has made them potentially vulnerable to seizure. If we can first take down their command systems and stop them being launched. Which brings us back to Cheget . . .”

“So, how do they talk to each other?” asked Dillon, evidently guessing where this might be leading.

“By a number of means. The basis of the system is a two-way communications system called Signal A, with a sub-system known as V’yuga, all backed up by an emergency system: Perimetr. Signal A has a high degree of redundancy—that means back-up systems, in case the primary system fails—and is kept combat ready at all times. We know it is very reliable with several communications tracks, each with a different communications channel: radio, cable, satellite, tropospheric. V’yuga adds yet more backup with HF, VHF and a satellite link.”

“Sounds like they’ve thought things through,” commented Dillon.

“You’re dead right, ma’am. These guys know what they’re doing. On top of which, Signal A and V’yuga are interfaced electronically and algorithmically, which again ensures a high degree of security for all the communications channels. And as if that’s not enough, Perimetr—the back-up system—can transmit an order from the General Staff to the missile launchers direct, thus bypassing all intermediate command posts.”

McCann paused and the President gestured for him to continue.