Chapters (60)
- Cover
- Dedication
- Foreword
- Preface
- Prologue
- PART ONE
- Kharkiv, Ukraine
- The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
- Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
- The Kremlin, Moscow
- Washington, D.C.
- Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
- North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
- Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
- Riga, Latvia
- National Defense Control Center, Moscow
- Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
- NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
- Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
- Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
- Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
- Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
- British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
- The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
- HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
- National Defense Control Center, Moscow
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
- Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
- 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
- HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
- Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
- PART TWO
- Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
- The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
- The White House, Washington, D.C.
- NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
- Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
- PART THREE
- “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
- North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
- GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
- Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
- Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
- The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
- Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
- Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
- Over Wroclaw, Poland
- Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
- 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
- Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
- Epilogue
- Glossary
- Acknowledgments
- Notes
“Iskander . . . or our Tomahawks for that matter, are tactical in that they can be moved around easily. The Iskanders in Kaliningrad are mounted on vehicles. You’ll have seen shots of them driving past the saluting stand at their May Day Parade in Moscow. They are smaller and have a much shorter range than an ICBM, but as I said, it is pretty academic once they start flying. They can carry a normal warhead or a nuclear one—again like our Tomahawks. And, like our Tomahawks, they are extremely accurate and difficult to knock down. But the key thing to remember is that even the smallest one of these is many, many times more powerful than the ones we dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Just imagine that mushroom cloud, magnified many times over, exploding over the cities of Western Europe.”
McCann looked around him and, although Bear knew the horrendous statistics, he found himself almost unable to breathe with the magnitude of what was being described.
Satisfied that he had made his message clear, McCann continued, “Now, the point for us here today is that the Russians moved these nuclear Iskanders to Kaliningrad to threaten NATO and destabilize the Baltics. Which they have certainly succeeded in doing. But that also means that, unlike their nuclear missile subs, which are hidden at sea, or their ICBMs, which are dug in far behind their borders where we cannot get to them, we could get at these. It is the fact that they are mobile that has made them potentially vulnerable to seizure. If we can first take down their command systems and stop them being launched. Which brings us back to Cheget . . .”
“So, how do they talk to each other?” asked Dillon, evidently guessing where this might be leading.
“By a number of means. The basis of the system is a two-way communications system called Signal A, with a sub-system known as V’yuga, all backed up by an emergency system: Perimetr. Signal A has a high degree of redundancy—that means back-up systems, in case the primary system fails—and is kept combat ready at all times. We know it is very reliable with several communications tracks, each with a different communications channel: radio, cable, satellite, tropospheric. V’yuga adds yet more backup with HF, VHF and a satellite link.”
“Sounds like they’ve thought things through,” commented Dillon.
“You’re dead right, ma’am. These guys know what they’re doing. On top of which, Signal A and V’yuga are interfaced electronically and algorithmically, which again ensures a high degree of security for all the communications channels. And as if that’s not enough, Perimetr—the back-up system—can transmit an order from the General Staff to the missile launchers direct, thus bypassing all intermediate command posts.”
McCann paused and the President gestured for him to continue.