Back War with Russia
Chapters (60)
  1. Cover
  2. Dedication
  3. Foreword
  4. Preface
  5. Prologue
  6. PART ONE
  7. Kharkiv, Ukraine
  8. The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
  9. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
  10. Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
  11. The Kremlin, Moscow
  12. Washington, D.C.
  13. Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
  14. North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  15. Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
  16. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  17. Riga, Latvia
  18. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  19. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  20. NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  21. National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
  22. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
  23. Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
  24. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  25. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  26. Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
  27. British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
  28. The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
  29. HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
  30. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  31. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  32. Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
  33. 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
  34. HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
  35. Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
  36. PART TWO
  37. Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
  38. The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
  39. The White House, Washington, D.C.
  40. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
  41. Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
  42. PART THREE
  43. “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
  44. North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  45. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
  46. GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
  47. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  48. Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
  49. The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
  50. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  51. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  52. Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
  53. Over Wroclaw, Poland
  54. Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  55. 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
  56. Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  57. Epilogue
  58. Glossary
  59. Acknowledgments
  60. Notes

“I need to thin out our garrison in Kaliningrad,” he said bluntly. “If we try to stay strong everywhere we will be strong nowhere. As I told you, we have thinned out in Ukraine, but I can only go so far. Any more and the ‘dubs’—dumb Ukrainian bastards—will be pushing our forces back and, if we suffer reverses there, that would be the ultimate humiliation. That said, the main threat comes from the Baltic states, so that is where the main effort should be. Kaliningrad is secure and I will leave sufficient forces there. The population is Russian and loyal, so that at least remains a secure base for us.”

“And NATO?” the President asked, as he did at every such briefing.

“No change. Any threat from NATO? Not a chance. First, it is still in disarray, so it will be unable to mount any credible threat against us. Second, even if they had the men, the Western Alliance would not dare undertake offensive operations against Russian soil.”

“To reinforce General Gerayev’s point, does NATO understand that if they ever try to attack Russian soil I will use nuclear weapons, Yevgeney Sergeyevich?” the President asked the Foreign Minister.

“Certainly they do. It has been made quite clear through diplomatic channels that you would not hesitate to use them in the event of either a NATO attack on the Baltic states, or any attack on Russian soil,” the Foreign Minister replied, with all the smoothness of a man used to dealing with diplomats.

Alongside him on the screen, the Deputy President and Director of FSB nodded in support.

“In fact,” the Foreign Minister continued, “just so we are clear, Vladimir Vladimirovich, it has been made known that Russia considers that the Baltic states are once again Russia.”

“Very well, Mikhail Nikolayevich. You may take the increased risk in Kaliningrad . . . but I want the insurrection in the Baltic states crushed within the month. Is that clear?”

“Very clear,” said Gareyev.

“And that British captain brought to me in Moscow.”

Komarov flicked the switch on the remote control and the screen went blank. The President sat silent, deep in thought. Here, Komarov could see, was a man who had thought he controlled events, but was now beginning to recognize that the dynamic he had started was not so easily controlled. Obviously, the propaganda war was not going as planned. The two NATO ships sunk in Riga and the US airmen slaughtered at Lielvārde had been written off as an unfortunate error—collateral damage. But the sinking of the Eckernförde had so enraged Germany that it looked as if it had jolted them out of their traditional pacifism. Not only were the Germans rediscovering their balls, they were now ready to implement the collective defense guarantee.