Back War with Russia Save as PDF
Chapters (60)
  1. Cover
  2. Dedication
  3. Foreword
  4. Preface
  5. Prologue
  6. PART ONE
  7. Kharkiv, Ukraine
  8. The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
  9. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
  10. Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
  11. The Kremlin, Moscow
  12. Washington, D.C.
  13. Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
  14. North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  15. Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
  16. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  17. Riga, Latvia
  18. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  19. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  20. NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  21. National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
  22. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
  23. Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
  24. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  25. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  26. Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
  27. British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
  28. The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
  29. HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
  30. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  31. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  32. Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
  33. 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
  34. HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
  35. Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
  36. PART TWO
  37. Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
  38. The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
  39. The White House, Washington, D.C.
  40. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
  41. Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
  42. PART THREE
  43. “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
  44. North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  45. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
  46. GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
  47. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  48. Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
  49. The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
  50. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  51. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  52. Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
  53. Over Wroclaw, Poland
  54. Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  55. 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
  56. Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  57. Epilogue
  58. Glossary
  59. Acknowledgments
  60. Notes

“Good analogy, Dave. Hitler initially had no intentions of occupying France or planning an invasion of Britain, but when it came to it, he found it much easier than he’d expected. Then he realized that if he inflicted a crushing defeat on his enemies, they’d never be able to come back at him. The President is not only paranoid with his fear of NATO, but he’s also paranoid because he knows that the only way he’ll leave the Kremlin is feet first . . . either as a result of old age, or with a bullet in the back of his head. If he’s to make it the former, he’s got to stay in power, come what may, and that means he’s got to keep going. If he’s found it so easy to take the Baltics, what is to stop him marching into Warsaw? Or even Berlin? He’s making the age-old mistake of thinking that war has a logic and that he can control it. But no one can control the dynamic of war once Pandora’s box is open. He’d have done well to have studied Clausewitz.”

McKinlay, recalling his Commandant’s paper on Carl von Clausewitz at Camberley, quoted from the Prussian philosopher of war: “War has its own grammar, but not its own logic.” Then he added, “And he’s also forgotten that strategy has a human dimension.”

“That’ll be our opportunity, Dave,” continued Howard. “In his quest for dominion. What do the Russians call it . . . Derzhava. He’s failed to take account of the reality of war; that there will always be completely unexpected turns of events that mean his intention to settle for one thing will become unrealistic and he’ll have to settle for something else. He thinks he can apply his professed A2/AA—anti-access/area denial—strategy to lock us out of the Baltics. But he’s not thought through the second- and third-order implications of that. Not least the fact that people in the Baltics won’t settle for it. And it’s my guess that most of the Russian speakers there will be outraged by what he’s done and join the opposition. They may have been getting hot under the collar with the internal politics of some of what was going on over there. But that’s the very point. It’s politics, and when push comes to shove, I’ll wager they much prefer living in an imperfect Western democracy than under the President’s boot. Look at the numbers of Russian-speaking Ukrainians who’ve been fighting the Russians there.”