Chapters (40)
- Cover Page
- Title Page
- Dedication
- Prologue A Brief History of Banting
- Part One
- Chapter 1
- Chapter 2
- Chapter 3
- Chapter 4
- Part Two
- Chapter 5
- Chapter 6
- Chapter 7
- Chapter 8
- Chapter 9
- Chapter 10
- Chapter 11
- Chapter 12
- Chapter 13
- Part Three
- Chapter 14
- Chapter 15
- Chapter 16
- Chapter 17
- Chapter 18
- Chapter 19
- Chapter 20
- Chapter 21
- Chapter 22
- Chapter 23
- Chapter 24
- Epilogue
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Acknowledgments
- Illustration Credits
- A Note About the Author
- Also by Gary Taubes
- Footnotes
- Copyright
Four of these studies tried to establish relationships between dietary fat and health within populations—in Honolulu, Puerto Rico, Chicago (Stamler and Shekelle’s second Western Electric study), and Framingham, Massachusetts. None of them succeeded. In Honolulu, the researchers followed seventy-three hundred men of Japanese descent and concluded that the men who developed heart disease seemed to eat slightly more fat and saturated fat than those who didn’t, but the men who died seemed to eat slightly less fat and slightly less saturated fat than those who didn’t. This observation was made in Framingham and Puerto Rico as well. In 1981, investigators from the three studies published an article in the journal Circulation discussing the problem. They said it posed a dilemma for dietary advice, but not an insurmountable one. The fact that the men in Puerto Rico and Honolulu who remained free of heart disease seemed to eat more starches suggested that it might be a good idea to recommend that we all eat more starch, as McGovern’s Dietary Goals actually had. And because the advice should never be to eat more calories, we would have to eat less fat to avoid gaining weight.
When one is reading this report, it’s hard to avoid the suspicion that once the government began advocating fat reduction in the American diet it changed the way many investigators in this science perceived their obligations. Those who believed that dietary fat caused heart disease had always preferentially interpreted their data in the light of that hypothesis. Now they no longer felt obliged to test any hypothesis, let alone Keys’s. Rather, they seemed to consider their obligation to be that of “reconciling [their] study findings with current programs of prevention,” which meant the now official government recommendations. Moreover, these studies were expensive, and one way to justify the expense was to generate evidence that supported the official advice to avoid fat. If the evidence didn’t support the recommendations, then the task was to interpret it so that it did.*16