Back War with Russia
Chapters (60)
  1. Cover
  2. Dedication
  3. Foreword
  4. Preface
  5. Prologue
  6. PART ONE
  7. Kharkiv, Ukraine
  8. The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
  9. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
  10. Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
  11. The Kremlin, Moscow
  12. Washington, D.C.
  13. Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
  14. North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  15. Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
  16. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  17. Riga, Latvia
  18. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  19. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  20. NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  21. National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
  22. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
  23. Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
  24. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  25. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  26. Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
  27. British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
  28. The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
  29. HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
  30. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  31. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  32. Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
  33. 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
  34. HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
  35. Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
  36. PART TWO
  37. Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
  38. The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
  39. The White House, Washington, D.C.
  40. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
  41. Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
  42. PART THREE
  43. “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
  44. North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  45. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
  46. GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
  47. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  48. Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
  49. The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
  50. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  51. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  52. Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
  53. Over Wroclaw, Poland
  54. Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  55. 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
  56. Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  57. Epilogue
  58. Glossary
  59. Acknowledgments
  60. Notes

“And if this were not enough, we have seen unprecedented military activity on the borders of Latvia and our Baltic neighbors. Our history tells us never to trust Russia. It was Count Shuvalov, a Russian who was Governor General of what were then the Baltic Provinces in the Tsarist Empire one hundred and fifty years ago, who said, and I quote: ‘The historical mission of the Baltic provinces is to serve as a battlefield for the problems of the highest politics in Europe.’ Please, my fellow ambassadors, we have no desire to be Russia’s battlefield once again!”

He stopped, overcome with emotion. He had the attention of all.

“Our memories are long. Latvia has only existed as a sovereign state for two decades between the world wars of the last century and once again since 1991. So, we are all too aware of the fate which is in store for us if we fail to deter the Russians this time. We firmly believe that, unless NATO declares an Article Five emergency and provides immediate military, diplomatic and political support to Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, then Russia will attempt to take over the Baltic states. Secretary General, I call upon the allies to accept that an attack is taking place on Latvia right now and therefore to agree to implement Article Five.”

He stopped, sighed, took off his spectacles and sat back. Silence reigned in the NAC Chamber. After a pause, Secretary General Kostilek called upon the Estonian and then the Lithuanian ambassadors to speak. Both spoke in turn, equally eloquently and equally persuasively.

Kostilek turned to the Chairman of the Military Committee. “General Vahr, can I ask for the advice of the NATO military authorities, please.”

“Secretary General, I regret that the Military Committee is unable to agree a common line due to different views among nations. I therefore propose we ask DSACEUR for his military advice.”

Kostilek nodded and turned to McKinlay. “General, the floor is yours.”

McKinlay cleared his throat. “Thank you, Secretary General. In line with the direction of the NAC, the NATO military authorities have spent much time considering the nature of Article Five in the twenty-first century. We recognize the dangers of viewing it through Cold War spectacles. So, ladies and gentlemen, we must no longer think of an attack on a NATO member in terms of massed Soviet tanks invading across the Inner German Border, or biting off a chunk of northern Norway, as we did back in the Cold War days. This means the Latvian ambassador is right. The military assessment is that what we are seeing is a new form of state-on-state war in which, gradually, the Russians will ramp up the pressure on the target state, in this case Latvia, while remaining under the threshold of what would traditionally generate an Article Five response from NATO. The best way to stop this crisis from getting out of control is to meet the Russians with strength.”