Back War with Russia Save as PDF
Chapters (60)
  1. Cover
  2. Dedication
  3. Foreword
  4. Preface
  5. Prologue
  6. PART ONE
  7. Kharkiv, Ukraine
  8. The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
  9. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
  10. Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
  11. The Kremlin, Moscow
  12. Washington, D.C.
  13. Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
  14. North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  15. Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
  16. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  17. Riga, Latvia
  18. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  19. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  20. NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  21. National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
  22. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
  23. Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
  24. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  25. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  26. Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
  27. British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
  28. The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
  29. HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
  30. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  31. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  32. Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
  33. 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
  34. HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
  35. Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
  36. PART TWO
  37. Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
  38. The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
  39. The White House, Washington, D.C.
  40. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
  41. Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
  42. PART THREE
  43. “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
  44. North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  45. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
  46. GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
  47. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  48. Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
  49. The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
  50. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  51. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  52. Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
  53. Over Wroclaw, Poland
  54. Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  55. 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
  56. Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  57. Epilogue
  58. Glossary
  59. Acknowledgments
  60. Notes

“Secretary General, ladies and gentlemen, I will be brief. First, let me point out that NATO has a small maritime presence in the Baltic already. The Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group, or SNMCMG, is currently exercising in the Baltic with ships from Germany, Poland, Norway, UK and Belgium. However, while an important demonstration of NATO’s presence in the Baltic, it is not a deterrent force as such, as it only has very limited offensive capability. As for the would-be ‘Very High Readiness Joint Task Force,’ the VJTF if you will forgive another NATO acronym, the reality is that, despite the best of intentions, it is a long way from being ready for anything. It is an ad hoc formation of units from fourteen different nations and it has never trained together properly in the field, so—and I’m going to put this bluntly so there are no misunderstandings—it is simply not ready for combat. Not only that, while the lead element of the Task Force is at high readiness to move, the reality is that we’d be doing well to get it ready in place within twenty-eight days.”

McKinlay looked around the room. None of the ambassadors looked surprised.

He continued, “And then there are the force levels. Of the nations who have offered troops to the Very High Readiness Task Force, only the designated Danish, French and UK units are ready for deployment within three days. I have spoken to the Chiefs of Defense of the other contributing nations, but none can give me any assurances that their forces will be ready in less than two weeks. Or at all . . .”

Now a few of the ambassadors began to look unhappy at the implied criticism. Kostilek intervened. “Thank you, DSACEUR, for the reminder about the NATO minesweeper group. But you do not bring any comfort with your comments about the problems with the High Readiness Task Force. What about the NATO Response Force, the NRF?”

“I’m afraid the situation doesn’t get any better,” replied McKinlay. “The aspiration to deliver forty thousand troops as part of the NRF is just that. An aspiration and one which only exists on paper. Things are better for the maritime and air components, but we have to be realistic about the land component. Even if the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force of five thousand could be made available in time, it would not amount to a credible and capable deterrent to the Russians. But . . .” and he resisted the temptation to laugh sardonically, “we do have a headquarters which could command the force if, that is, it had a force to command. However, even that depends on the framework nation—the country responsible for providing the bulk of the manpower and equipment to ensure that the headquarters can operate—being prepared to see notice to move reduced.”

“So?” questioned Kostilek. “Why is there a problem with at least doing that?”