Chapters (60)
- Cover
- Dedication
- Foreword
- Preface
- Prologue
- PART ONE
- Kharkiv, Ukraine
- The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
- Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
- The Kremlin, Moscow
- Washington, D.C.
- Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
- North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
- Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
- Riga, Latvia
- National Defense Control Center, Moscow
- Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
- NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
- Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
- Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
- Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
- Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
- British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
- The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
- HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
- National Defense Control Center, Moscow
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
- Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
- 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
- HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
- Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
- PART TWO
- Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
- The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
- The White House, Washington, D.C.
- NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
- Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
- PART THREE
- “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
- North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
- GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
- Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
- Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
- The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
- Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
- Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
- Over Wroclaw, Poland
- Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
- 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
- Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
- Epilogue
- Glossary
- Acknowledgments
- Notes
“Secretary General, ladies and gentlemen, I will be brief. First, let me point out that NATO has a small maritime presence in the Baltic already. The Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group, or SNMCMG, is currently exercising in the Baltic with ships from Germany, Poland, Norway, UK and Belgium. However, while an important demonstration of NATO’s presence in the Baltic, it is not a deterrent force as such, as it only has very limited offensive capability. As for the would-be ‘Very High Readiness Joint Task Force,’ the VJTF if you will forgive another NATO acronym, the reality is that, despite the best of intentions, it is a long way from being ready for anything. It is an ad hoc formation of units from fourteen different nations and it has never trained together properly in the field, so—and I’m going to put this bluntly so there are no misunderstandings—it is simply not ready for combat. Not only that, while the lead element of the Task Force is at high readiness to move, the reality is that we’d be doing well to get it ready in place within twenty-eight days.”
McKinlay looked around the room. None of the ambassadors looked surprised.
He continued, “And then there are the force levels. Of the nations who have offered troops to the Very High Readiness Task Force, only the designated Danish, French and UK units are ready for deployment within three days. I have spoken to the Chiefs of Defense of the other contributing nations, but none can give me any assurances that their forces will be ready in less than two weeks. Or at all . . .”
Now a few of the ambassadors began to look unhappy at the implied criticism. Kostilek intervened. “Thank you, DSACEUR, for the reminder about the NATO minesweeper group. But you do not bring any comfort with your comments about the problems with the High Readiness Task Force. What about the NATO Response Force, the NRF?”
“I’m afraid the situation doesn’t get any better,” replied McKinlay. “The aspiration to deliver forty thousand troops as part of the NRF is just that. An aspiration and one which only exists on paper. Things are better for the maritime and air components, but we have to be realistic about the land component. Even if the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force of five thousand could be made available in time, it would not amount to a credible and capable deterrent to the Russians. But . . .” and he resisted the temptation to laugh sardonically, “we do have a headquarters which could command the force if, that is, it had a force to command. However, even that depends on the framework nation—the country responsible for providing the bulk of the manpower and equipment to ensure that the headquarters can operate—being prepared to see notice to move reduced.”
“So?” questioned Kostilek. “Why is there a problem with at least doing that?”