Back War with Russia Save as PDF
Chapters (60)
  1. Cover
  2. Dedication
  3. Foreword
  4. Preface
  5. Prologue
  6. PART ONE
  7. Kharkiv, Ukraine
  8. The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
  9. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
  10. Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
  11. The Kremlin, Moscow
  12. Washington, D.C.
  13. Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
  14. North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  15. Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
  16. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  17. Riga, Latvia
  18. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  19. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  20. NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  21. National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
  22. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
  23. Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
  24. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  25. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  26. Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
  27. British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
  28. The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
  29. HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
  30. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  31. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  32. Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
  33. 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
  34. HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
  35. Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
  36. PART TWO
  37. Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
  38. The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
  39. The White House, Washington, D.C.
  40. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
  41. Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
  42. PART THREE
  43. “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
  44. North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  45. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
  46. GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
  47. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  48. Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
  49. The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
  50. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  51. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  52. Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
  53. Over Wroclaw, Poland
  54. Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  55. 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
  56. Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  57. Epilogue
  58. Glossary
  59. Acknowledgments
  60. Notes

“Despite their numbers we are ready for them. The Baltic Fleet will harass and interdict NATO’s naval and amphibious forces as it sails east to conduct landings on the Estonian coast. Even if the invasion force succeeds in getting through and landing on the beaches, 6th Army has established strong defensive positions on the Estonian coast on all the likely invasion beaches, while maintaining mobile armored reserves in depth ready to counter-attack. In the south, 20th Guards Army is deployed on the southern Lithuanian border. I can also report that 2nd Guards Tank Army has moved from its garrison in central Russia, at Samara, and been transferred to Western Military District. Meanwhile, the forces we withdrew from Kaliningrad and Ukraine will continue to contain the Forest Brother insurgency across the Baltic states.

“As for the air battle, NATO will be unable to win air superiority. Our Vorozneh radar in Kaliningrad is the match of anything they have and it can cover out to hundreds of kilometers. That’s enough to keep all of Eastern and Central Europe under surveillance and capable of tracking more than five hundred aircraft simultaneously. Once detected, NATO aircraft will be easy meat for our S-400 and S-500 air defense missile systems as well as our own interceptors. So we are confident that we will retain the air superiority that will allow us to defeat NATO decisively on the ground.”

“What about Kaliningrad? Is there a danger that NATO could try and attack us there?”

“We think not, Vladimir Vladimirovich,” answered the Foreign Minister, who had remained quiet up to now. “NATO goes on endlessly about being purely a defensive alliance. It is one thing to implement Article Five of the Washington Treaty to defend a member state, but quite another to attack Russian sovereign territory. NATO will never get the agreement of the NAC to do that. Apart from anything else, our friends in Athens and Budapest have confirmed they would veto any such proposal.”

Gareyev intervened. “We know that the Americans and British use their Special Forces as the tip of their spear. We have been watching them carefully and I can tell you there are no Special Forces anywhere near Kaliningrad.”

The President looked satisfied; very much more his old self.

Because if the Alliance does attack, Komarov thought to himself, and Russia does see them off as Gareyev clearly believes they would, then the President’s position, and mine alongside him, would be sealed for the rest of his life.

If NATO did the sensible thing and rattled their sabers, but no more, then the result would be the same: the President would have won. He and the President were only at risk if Russia were defeated and were that to happen, every man around this table would be in the same sinking ship. No, on reflection, although these were dangerous times, the President’s fate was firmly linked with that of Russia and it was the same for these men.