Chapters (60)
- Cover
- Dedication
- Foreword
- Preface
- Prologue
- PART ONE
- Kharkiv, Ukraine
- The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
- Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
- The Kremlin, Moscow
- Washington, D.C.
- Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
- North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
- Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
- Riga, Latvia
- National Defense Control Center, Moscow
- Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
- NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
- Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
- Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
- Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
- Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
- British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
- The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
- HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
- National Defense Control Center, Moscow
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
- Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
- 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
- HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
- Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
- PART TWO
- Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
- The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
- The White House, Washington, D.C.
- NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
- Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
- PART THREE
- “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
- North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
- GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
- Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
- Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
- The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
- Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
- Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
- Over Wroclaw, Poland
- Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
- 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
- Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
- Epilogue
- Glossary
- Acknowledgments
- Notes
“So, effectively what you are doing is using the computers in the network to block the network,” said Little slowly, but looking somewhat confused; as well he might, thought Walker.
“Exactly, Prime Minister,” replied Allenby crisply. “But the really clever thing about Rasputin is that we can activate it when we want to. Most worms go into action as soon as they enter the system. But Rasputin sits in their system, dormant, until we want it to create chaos.”
“OK . . . So how do you get into the network in the first place?”
“Good question, Prime Minister,” GCHQ Director Berry intervened. “Initially we tried to mount an operation with the CIA and MI6 to break into the servers of Russia’s National Defense Control Center, the NDCC, while it was being built. However, to give them credit—and the Russians are seriously good at this sort of thing—we failed. One reason is that their servers are Russian-made, which maximizes their resistance to our offensive cyber capabilities. That by the way, Prime Minister, is another conversation for another day, about our own foreign-built servers . . . but I digress . . . Anyway, any defense is only as good as its weakest links. And Nicola here found a way in.” He smiled like a magician producing a rabbit from a hat, before pointing back to Allenby and so inviting her to explain.
“You’ll appreciate, Prime Minister, that any computer connected to the internet is susceptible to infiltration and takeover. We had to find a way to access a closed network like the one used by the Russian General Staff. So we looked for an individual with access to the closed network into whose open-network computer we might be able to install a virus.”
“And . . . ?”
“PJHQ hosted a visit a few years ago from a group of Russians who were setting up the NDCC, before Crimea—when relations were still OK. Well, naturally, my predecessor took advantage of it and laid the ground work. The team monitored the computer usage of a number of the colonels when they were back in their hotel and managed to get IP addresses and other details. Roll the clock forward and one of those colonels is now a general in the NDCC, so we continued to monitor his usage and hacked into his computer with the details recorded from that time. We had clocked that he was a regular subscriber to a couple of dodgy websites and we also knew that he was in the habit of taking work home and transferring work from his laptop onto his office computer.