Back War with Russia
Chapters (60)
  1. Cover
  2. Dedication
  3. Foreword
  4. Preface
  5. Prologue
  6. PART ONE
  7. Kharkiv, Ukraine
  8. The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
  9. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
  10. Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
  11. The Kremlin, Moscow
  12. Washington, D.C.
  13. Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
  14. North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  15. Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
  16. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  17. Riga, Latvia
  18. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  19. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  20. NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  21. National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
  22. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
  23. Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
  24. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  25. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  26. Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
  27. British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
  28. The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
  29. HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
  30. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  31. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  32. Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
  33. 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
  34. HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
  35. Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
  36. PART TWO
  37. Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
  38. The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
  39. The White House, Washington, D.C.
  40. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
  41. Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
  42. PART THREE
  43. “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
  44. North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  45. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
  46. GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
  47. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  48. Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
  49. The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
  50. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  51. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  52. Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
  53. Over Wroclaw, Poland
  54. Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  55. 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
  56. Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  57. Epilogue
  58. Glossary
  59. Acknowledgments
  60. Notes

“So, effectively what you are doing is using the computers in the network to block the network,” said Little slowly, but looking somewhat confused; as well he might, thought Walker.

“Exactly, Prime Minister,” replied Allenby crisply. “But the really clever thing about Rasputin is that we can activate it when we want to. Most worms go into action as soon as they enter the system. But Rasputin sits in their system, dormant, until we want it to create chaos.”

“OK . . . So how do you get into the network in the first place?”

“Good question, Prime Minister,” GCHQ Director Berry intervened. “Initially we tried to mount an operation with the CIA and MI6 to break into the servers of Russia’s National Defense Control Center, the NDCC, while it was being built. However, to give them credit—and the Russians are seriously good at this sort of thing—we failed. One reason is that their servers are Russian-made, which maximizes their resistance to our offensive cyber capabilities. That by the way, Prime Minister, is another conversation for another day, about our own foreign-built servers . . . but I digress . . . Anyway, any defense is only as good as its weakest links. And Nicola here found a way in.” He smiled like a magician producing a rabbit from a hat, before pointing back to Allenby and so inviting her to explain.

“You’ll appreciate, Prime Minister, that any computer connected to the internet is susceptible to infiltration and takeover. We had to find a way to access a closed network like the one used by the Russian General Staff. So we looked for an individual with access to the closed network into whose open-network computer we might be able to install a virus.”

“And . . . ?”

“PJHQ hosted a visit a few years ago from a group of Russians who were setting up the NDCC, before Crimea—when relations were still OK. Well, naturally, my predecessor took advantage of it and laid the ground work. The team monitored the computer usage of a number of the colonels when they were back in their hotel and managed to get IP addresses and other details. Roll the clock forward and one of those colonels is now a general in the NDCC, so we continued to monitor his usage and hacked into his computer with the details recorded from that time. We had clocked that he was a regular subscriber to a couple of dodgy websites and we also knew that he was in the habit of taking work home and transferring work from his laptop onto his office computer.