Chapters (60)
- Cover
- Dedication
- Foreword
- Preface
- Prologue
- PART ONE
- Kharkiv, Ukraine
- The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
- Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
- The Kremlin, Moscow
- Washington, D.C.
- Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
- North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
- Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
- Riga, Latvia
- National Defense Control Center, Moscow
- Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
- NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
- Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
- Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
- Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
- Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
- British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
- The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
- HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
- National Defense Control Center, Moscow
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
- Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
- 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
- HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
- Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
- PART TWO
- Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
- The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
- The White House, Washington, D.C.
- NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
- Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
- PART THREE
- “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
- North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
- GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
- Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
- Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
- The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
- Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
- Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
- Over Wroclaw, Poland
- Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
- 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
- Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
- Epilogue
- Glossary
- Acknowledgments
- Notes
“OK, then I’ll need to get the staff to look at the proposition in detail. We’d need to pull together the right force mix and set the political conditions with the NATO members if it is to have any chance of success . . . and it’s a big ask for NATO to mount an offensive operation. But, no doubt about it, if we could pull it off, it would certainly unhinge the Russians strategically. It’s the last thing they’d expect. But there are a couple of very important factors we need to consider. First, trying to evict the Russians from the Baltic states means taking them on where they are strongest. So, at first glance, that argues for a more indirect approach. But, if they’re thinning out the Kaliningrad garrison, then that is definitely in our favor. The second issue, and by far my biggest concern, is that the Russian President has made it very clear that any attack on the Baltics, or on the soil of Russia, will result in the use of nuclear weapons. No ifs, no buts. And I for one believe him. Those Iskander nuclear missile batteries in Kaliningrad are within range of Berlin, Copenhagen and Warsaw. Which, of course, is exactly why they are there.”
He paused. “That means we have to be clever. I’m hoping the National Security Agency will tell us that they can come up with something very clever on the cyber front—if they haven’t done so already. Any cyber solution will need to cover all command and control systems, not just nuclear. Furthermore, it will need to be something they know will work. The consequences of calling this wrong when we are facing a nuclear response are beyond my imagination.”
“You take that up with them and I’ll set the political conditions,” replied Dillon. “But what are we going to need in the way of forces? What can we provide and what can our allies offer?”
“Ma’am, we’re talking about one of the most heavily militarized regions of Europe here.”
In the short time he’d had to consider this idea before the meeting, Bear had pulled some figures off the Pentagon Intelligence website and handed them to MacWhite, who started reading them out.
“At full strength, and accepting that they might be thinning out, we estimate the Russians have got up to fourteen thousand troops in Kaliningrad, broken down into three fighting brigades, plus artillery, missiles and helicopters. Hardware-wise that works out at over eight hundred main battle tanks, twelve hundred other armored vehicles and over three hundred artillery or rocket systems. That’s a hell of a lot of hardware in a fairly small area. So, this can only work if the Russians significantly reduce those numbers to reinforce the Baltics.”
Dillon was silent as the scale of the Russian troops in Fortress Kaliningrad sunk in.