Back War with Russia Save as PDF
Chapters (60)
  1. Cover
  2. Dedication
  3. Foreword
  4. Preface
  5. Prologue
  6. PART ONE
  7. Kharkiv, Ukraine
  8. The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
  9. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
  10. Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
  11. The Kremlin, Moscow
  12. Washington, D.C.
  13. Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
  14. North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  15. Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
  16. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  17. Riga, Latvia
  18. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  19. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  20. NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  21. National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
  22. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
  23. Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
  24. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  25. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  26. Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
  27. British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
  28. The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
  29. HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
  30. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  31. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  32. Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
  33. 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
  34. HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
  35. Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
  36. PART TWO
  37. Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
  38. The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
  39. The White House, Washington, D.C.
  40. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
  41. Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
  42. PART THREE
  43. “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
  44. North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  45. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
  46. GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
  47. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  48. Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
  49. The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
  50. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  51. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  52. Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
  53. Over Wroclaw, Poland
  54. Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  55. 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
  56. Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  57. Epilogue
  58. Glossary
  59. Acknowledgments
  60. Notes

“OK, then I’ll need to get the staff to look at the proposition in detail. We’d need to pull together the right force mix and set the political conditions with the NATO members if it is to have any chance of success . . . and it’s a big ask for NATO to mount an offensive operation. But, no doubt about it, if we could pull it off, it would certainly unhinge the Russians strategically. It’s the last thing they’d expect. But there are a couple of very important factors we need to consider. First, trying to evict the Russians from the Baltic states means taking them on where they are strongest. So, at first glance, that argues for a more indirect approach. But, if they’re thinning out the Kaliningrad garrison, then that is definitely in our favor. The second issue, and by far my biggest concern, is that the Russian President has made it very clear that any attack on the Baltics, or on the soil of Russia, will result in the use of nuclear weapons. No ifs, no buts. And I for one believe him. Those Iskander nuclear missile batteries in Kaliningrad are within range of Berlin, Copenhagen and Warsaw. Which, of course, is exactly why they are there.”

He paused. “That means we have to be clever. I’m hoping the National Security Agency will tell us that they can come up with something very clever on the cyber front—if they haven’t done so already. Any cyber solution will need to cover all command and control systems, not just nuclear. Furthermore, it will need to be something they know will work. The consequences of calling this wrong when we are facing a nuclear response are beyond my imagination.”

“You take that up with them and I’ll set the political conditions,” replied Dillon. “But what are we going to need in the way of forces? What can we provide and what can our allies offer?”

“Ma’am, we’re talking about one of the most heavily militarized regions of Europe here.”

In the short time he’d had to consider this idea before the meeting, Bear had pulled some figures off the Pentagon Intelligence website and handed them to MacWhite, who started reading them out.

“At full strength, and accepting that they might be thinning out, we estimate the Russians have got up to fourteen thousand troops in Kaliningrad, broken down into three fighting brigades, plus artillery, missiles and helicopters. Hardware-wise that works out at over eight hundred main battle tanks, twelve hundred other armored vehicles and over three hundred artillery or rocket systems. That’s a hell of a lot of hardware in a fairly small area. So, this can only work if the Russians significantly reduce those numbers to reinforce the Baltics.”

Dillon was silent as the scale of the Russian troops in Fortress Kaliningrad sunk in.