“Listening in, Vladimir Vladimirovich,” replied Gareyev. “But I wanted to set the scene before he and his staff brief you in detail.”

Komarov was now concerned. His people were telling him that things were not going well in the Baltics, but the Presidential briefings back in the Kremlin this last week, while certainly not as upbeat as they had been the week before, had downplayed any major problems. However, as it was Gareyev giving tonight’s briefing, it could only mean he was about to give bad news. First, he was the only one prepared to talk to the President straight and, second, the War Cabinet must have waited for the President to be at his dacha to deliver this news. That must mean they were afraid to tell him in person. At the end of a TV link the President’s menace was, inevitably, somewhat diminished.

Even as Gareyev began to speak, Komarov detected from the onscreen body language of his ministers and senior advisers that the President’s position was no longer as absolute as it had been only a week before.

Gareyev continued. “The strategic picture is still favorable and our adversaries in the West are fully aware that any attack on us will result in a nuclear response. To reassure you, Vladimir Vladimirovich, you reduced notice to fire in our operational submarines, five of which are deployed at sea with eighty missiles on board. Each missile has sixteen warheads. That means we have a total of three hundred and twenty sea-launched warheads, each capable of completely destroying a major city. We also have our strategic rocket forces with three hundred and five land-based, intercontinental missiles, carrying a total of one thousand, one hundred and sixty-six warheads. Finally, we have our smaller, battlefield systems, such as Iskander, designed to take out specific military targets, but which will still completely eradicate a small city. They are also on a reduced notice to fire. You can see why we are confident about the strategic picture.

“However . . .” and he paused for obvious effect before delivering what Komarov knew was going to be bad news. “The situation in the Baltic states has changed and is giving ever more cause for concern.” Then, in the clipped unemotional tones of the professional soldier, Gareyev outlined how the Baltic states were aflame with the spirit of resistance and the extent to which Russia had underestimated not only the fury and anger their liberation would generate, but also the level of preparation the three countries had undertaken in expectation of an invasion.

Then he confronted the event that had possibly inflamed the spirit of resistance even more than the brutality of the occupation: the President’s embarrassment in the forest clearing at Ligatne, where he had been filmed on live TV ranting and raving at his security detachment against a backdrop of Russian helicopters being shot out of the sky in a well-planned aviation ambush.