Back War with Russia
Chapters (60)
  1. Cover
  2. Dedication
  3. Foreword
  4. Preface
  5. Prologue
  6. PART ONE
  7. Kharkiv, Ukraine
  8. The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
  9. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
  10. Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
  11. The Kremlin, Moscow
  12. Washington, D.C.
  13. Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
  14. North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  15. Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
  16. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  17. Riga, Latvia
  18. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  19. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  20. NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  21. National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
  22. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
  23. Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
  24. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  25. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  26. Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
  27. British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
  28. The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
  29. HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
  30. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  31. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  32. Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
  33. 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
  34. HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
  35. Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
  36. PART TWO
  37. Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
  38. The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
  39. The White House, Washington, D.C.
  40. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
  41. Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
  42. PART THREE
  43. “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
  44. North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  45. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
  46. GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
  47. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  48. Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
  49. The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
  50. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  51. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  52. Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
  53. Over Wroclaw, Poland
  54. Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  55. 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
  56. Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  57. Epilogue
  58. Glossary
  59. Acknowledgments
  60. Notes

Everage wilted for a moment in the face of the CDS’s vehemence. Then, ever the politician, he drew a deep breath, ready again to argue his corner.

“I said, enough,” the Prime Minister snapped. “Point taken, CDS . . . How will the Russians react?”

“That’s easy,” replied Kydd. “They’ll threaten to nuke us. For starters, they’ve got Iskander tactical nukes deployed in Kaliningrad.”

“But haven’t they’ve only got limited range and impact?” countered Little.

“Range, yes. Impact, no. Each one of those tactical nukes is many, many times more powerful than the bombs that flattened Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And you may think that is an acceptable risk sitting out of Iskander range in London,” Kydd gave both men a hard look. “But if you’re Polish, German or Danish, and well within Iskander range, you’d take a very different view. Besides, once tactical nukes start getting flung about, it’s a very short step to an exchange of intercontinental ballistic missiles . . . the really big boys. And then it’s welcome to Armageddon.”

“But surely, even if we’re outmatched conventionally, we’ve still got Trident?”

“OK, Prime Minister,” sighed Kydd, “let me take you through this from first principles. You ask what the Russians will do and I’ll repeat. They’ll do what they’ve done at the end of every snap exercise they’ve called recently. Launch an Iskander tactical nuke as what they call a de-escalatory measure to stop us dead in our tracks and stop us counter-attacking.”

“Hardly sounds to me like de-escalation. Surely them firing a nuke will lead to all-out nuclear war?” asked Little.

“That’s precisely the point, Prime Minister. It’s counter-intuitive . . . the President knows that there’s no way you are going to risk the destruction of human life in the UK by launching a Trident at Russia in response to his tactical nuke when, by so doing, you can almost guarantee a retaliatory strike from an intercontinental ballistic missile in return.”

“So, how should we respond? We just have to take it on the chin?”

“Sadly, with the state of our Armed Forces as they are today . . . Yes. That would be my advice. Plenty of people told the last government that to be effective, deterrence needs to be matched at every level, conventional and nuclear. As I’ve just explained, you can’t weaken conventional forces and expect Trident alone to protect you. Conversely, if we did have strong conventional forces, but no Trident, they could easily defeat us by threatening to nuke us and we would have no way of deterring them. By allowing our conventional forces to be run down as they have, our whole defense posture is now dangerously out of balance. When you’re up against a ruthless predatory bastard like the President, that means we are now in a very dangerous place.”

“So those billions spent on Trident were a false insurance policy, CDS?”