Back War with Russia
Chapters (60)
  1. Cover
  2. Dedication
  3. Foreword
  4. Preface
  5. Prologue
  6. PART ONE
  7. Kharkiv, Ukraine
  8. The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
  9. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
  10. Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
  11. The Kremlin, Moscow
  12. Washington, D.C.
  13. Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
  14. North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  15. Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
  16. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  17. Riga, Latvia
  18. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  19. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  20. NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  21. National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
  22. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
  23. Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
  24. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  25. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  26. Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
  27. British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
  28. The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
  29. HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
  30. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  31. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  32. Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
  33. 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
  34. HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
  35. Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
  36. PART TWO
  37. Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
  38. The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
  39. The White House, Washington, D.C.
  40. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
  41. Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
  42. PART THREE
  43. “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
  44. North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  45. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
  46. GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
  47. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  48. Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
  49. The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
  50. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  51. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  52. Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
  53. Over Wroclaw, Poland
  54. Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  55. 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
  56. Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  57. Epilogue
  58. Glossary
  59. Acknowledgments
  60. Notes

However, the absence of US soldiers on the ground to protect the trainers leaves them vulnerable to attack. The compromise solution is to provide US fighter air cover, although the generals warn that there is little a fighter aircraft, however sophisticated, can do to protect a few men on the ground from 20,000 feet. Only too aware that the American people in general, and the House of Representatives and the Senate in particular, will not countenance US “fighting” soldiers stationed in Ukraine, the President tells the generals to stop complaining and make it work. Anyway, the 2014 Minsk peace accord is still holding and not even the most hawkish US general is suggesting that Russia is about to attack.

The equipment and the trainers are sent, their mission specific: get the equipment installed and working, get the Ukrainians trained and then get out as quickly as possible.

In the UK, the new Prime Minister is distracted by the consequences of the UK electorate’s vote to leave the EU in the June 2016 referendum. In an attempt to enhance their “special relationship” with the United States, the UK timidly sent a small team of medics and supply officers to help train the Ukrainian army in 2015. However, far from sending a signal of strength and resolution, these efforts appear weak and the force a potential hostage to fortune. Just as bad, this move reinforces the Russian narrative of NATO trainers being Ukraine’s “foreign legion,” an insult that plays particularly well with nationalist forces at home.

In Ukraine, despite the political ambiguity of the 2014 Minsk ceasefire, major fighting has ceased and the war settled down to a semi-frozen conflict, with both sides— Ukrainian Army and “Russian Separatists,” although supported by Russian regular forces— occupying entrenched positions. Behind Ukrainian government lines a form of normality has emerged, which allows US trainers to work with the Ukrainian army under near peacetime conditions.

Unaccountably, the strident Kremlin propaganda of two years ago, portraying the deployment of trainers as evidence of the NATO threat to Russia, has recently gone quiet, helped no doubt by increasingly close cooperation between Russia, America, France, and Britain over air strikes in Syria. This absence of vitriol and threats gives the US president further confidence to send more US equipment and trainers, although still without proper “boots on the ground” protection in case it is deemed “provocative.”