Back War with Russia
Chapters (60)
  1. Cover
  2. Dedication
  3. Foreword
  4. Preface
  5. Prologue
  6. PART ONE
  7. Kharkiv, Ukraine
  8. The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
  9. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
  10. Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
  11. The Kremlin, Moscow
  12. Washington, D.C.
  13. Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
  14. North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  15. Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
  16. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  17. Riga, Latvia
  18. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  19. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  20. NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  21. National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
  22. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
  23. Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
  24. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  25. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  26. Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
  27. British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
  28. The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
  29. HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
  30. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  31. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  32. Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
  33. 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
  34. HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
  35. Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
  36. PART TWO
  37. Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
  38. The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
  39. The White House, Washington, D.C.
  40. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
  41. Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
  42. PART THREE
  43. “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
  44. North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  45. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
  46. GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
  47. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  48. Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
  49. The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
  50. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  51. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  52. Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
  53. Over Wroclaw, Poland
  54. Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  55. 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
  56. Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  57. Epilogue
  58. Glossary
  59. Acknowledgments
  60. Notes

This is why maintaining an effective conventional deterrent—military forces that can fight and hold off the Russians if they attack, but above all to persuade them not to attack in the first place—is critical. It is only by having strong conventional forces that we can hope to ensure there is never a need to use that final option: nuclear weapons. Put another way, weak conventional forces make the use of nuclear weapons as a last, desperate line of defense very much more likely.

Even without the release of nuclear weapons, if we do have to fight a conventional war, prepare yourself for appalling casualties. These would be infinitely greater than anything suffered in recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. There could well be casualties on a Second World War level of horror. Be under no illusion whatsoever: war has a grim and uncontrollable logic of its own. Once the first bombs and missiles are launched, who can say where the next lot will end up landing? If we are hitting Russians, why should New York, Washington, London, Berlin, Paris, or Warsaw not end up being targeted in return?

It does not need Russian soldiers marching though Berlin and Paris for the world as we know it to cease to exist. A militarily victorious Russia, able to dictate to a defeated Europe and NATO from the end of a barrel as to exactly what will and what will not be acceptable to them, will be enough for life as we now know it in the West to come to a very abrupt end. NATO will collapse and transatlantic, and therefore American, security will be threatened. The President will have achieved his aim of destroying NATO, the alliance of free, democratic countries he sees as standing between him and a return to Russian great power status.

“To the victor the spoils.” Always.

As Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the DSACEUR, I sat in the council meetings with defense ministers and the decision makers of NATO; I was part of the discussions and decisions on how force should be deployed, and I walked the corridors of power in NATO HQ Brussels, the White House, No. 10 Downing Street, and the Pentagon. In this book I will take you into those corridors as the politicians agonize over whether to send in Special Forces, order air strikes, or deploy armies and navies.

I will show you, based on my personal experience of NATO’s campaigns in Afghanistan and Libya, the posturing, the vanity, the political cynicism, and the moral cowardice which all too often characterize those decisions. I will also highlight the occasional statesmanship and how the leadership and moral courage of one individual of stature can change the course of history. I know, too, the reality of combat, so I will show you how decisions taken at the highest levels affect the men and women who fight the battles and who, together with innocent civilians, pay the price of war.