Chapters (60)
- Cover
- Dedication
- Foreword
- Preface
- Prologue
- PART ONE
- Kharkiv, Ukraine
- The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
- Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
- The Kremlin, Moscow
- Washington, D.C.
- Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
- North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
- Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
- Riga, Latvia
- National Defense Control Center, Moscow
- Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
- NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
- Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
- Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
- Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
- Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
- British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
- The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
- HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
- National Defense Control Center, Moscow
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
- Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
- 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
- HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
- Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
- PART TWO
- Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
- The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
- The White House, Washington, D.C.
- NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
- Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
- PART THREE
- “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
- North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
- Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
- GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
- Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
- Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
- The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
- Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
- Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
- Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
- Over Wroclaw, Poland
- Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
- 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
- Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
- Epilogue
- Glossary
- Acknowledgments
- Notes
Having unilaterally decided that this was the way the world would be for the foreseeable future, the 2010 Review then emasculated British military capability. The consequences are far-reaching and difficult, if not near impossible, to reverse: 20,000 experienced regular soldiers were axed from the Army, nearly a quarter of its strength. Royal Navy frigate and destroyer numbers—the work horses of any fleet—were cut right back. Some ships came off station from the Libyan maritime embargo in 2011 and sailed direct to the breaker’s yard. It seemed quite extraordinary to me at the time to see our warships being broken up at the very moment they were most needed. The unraveling of Libya and the deepening turmoil of the Arab Spring ought to have told any politician with any sense that the world was not as safe and predictable as they were busy assuring us it was. Not only were Royal Air Force fast-jet numbers removed from the inventory, but that essential capability for a proud maritime nation, maritime patrol aircraft, was also disbanded. It would be difficult to overstate the disbelief of our allies or delight of our enemies at this shortsighted decision.
When I said in London’s Sunday Times at the end of March 2014, as I stepped down as DSACEUR, that this was a “hell of a gamble,” the Defense Secretary was so infuriated at being questioned in public that I was summoned by General Sir Peter Wall, the head of the British Army, and told that the Defense Secretary had wanted “formal action” taken against me. However, formal action would have involved a court-martial and, fortunately for the latter’s political reputation—it also seems he had not appreciated that I reported to NATO and not to him—wiser counsel had prevailed. But the damage to our armed forces and, through them, our ability to defend our national interests—the first duty of any government—had already been done.
This failure to understand the realities of dealing with bullies was further reinforced during Britain’s response to the crisis in the Middle East, caused by the eruption on the scene of the so-called Islamic State in the summer of 2014. Both the Prime Minister and the new Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, recently moved into post from Defense Minister (where, after threatening me, he had continued to oversee the rundown of British forces) waxed apocalyptic on the threat IS posed and yet did nothing credible to confront that threat. Foreign Secretary Hammond’s hubristic boast that “Britain defined itself by the extent to which it punched above its weight” was proved hollow.