Back War with Russia
Chapters (60)
  1. Cover
  2. Dedication
  3. Foreword
  4. Preface
  5. Prologue
  6. PART ONE
  7. Kharkiv, Ukraine
  8. The President’s weekly defense and foreign policy meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow
  9. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
  10. Briefing Room, Boryspill Air Force Base, Ukraine
  11. The Kremlin, Moscow
  12. Washington, D.C.
  13. Residence of DSACEUR La Belle Alliance, Erbisoeul, Belgium
  14. North Atlantic Council Conference Room, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  15. Banks of River Daugava, Riga, Latvia
  16. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  17. Riga, Latvia
  18. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  19. Ādaži Training Camp, Latvia
  20. NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  21. National Armed Forces Joint HQ, Riga, Latvia
  22. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium
  23. Central European Time 1600 hours, Eastern Standard Time, The White House, Washington, D.C.
  24. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  25. Lielvārde Air Base, Latvia
  26. Camp David, Catoctin Mountains, Maryland
  27. British Embassy, 5, J.Alunana Street, Riga, Latvia
  28. The Russell Arms, Butler’s Cross, Buckinghamshire
  29. HMS Queen Elizabeth Middle Slip Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth
  30. National Defense Control Center, Moscow
  31. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  32. Somewhere in the forest, Gauja National Park, Latvia
  33. 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, London
  34. HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Baltic Sea
  35. Control Room, Kilo Class submarine Krasnokamensk, Baltic Sea
  36. PART TWO
  37. Prime Minister’s Office, House of Commons, London
  38. The Presidential Dacha Barvikha, Odintsovsky District of Moscow Oblast
  39. The White House, Washington, D.C.
  40. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
  41. Gauja National Park Forest, Latvia
  42. PART THREE
  43. “The Tank,” Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
  44. North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels
  45. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Cheltenham, England
  46. GCHQ, Cheltenham, England
  47. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  48. Headquarters, Kaliningrad Special Region, Kaliningrad
  49. The President’s Office, The Kremlin, Moscow
  50. Forest south of Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad, Russia
  51. Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Center (CCOMC) SHAPE headquarters, Mons, Belgium
  52. Command Bunker, Iskander Missile Battery Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad
  53. Over Wroclaw, Poland
  54. Forest north of Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  55. 25,000 feet above Kaliningrad
  56. Close to the Pravdinsk Iskander Battery, Kaliningrad
  57. Epilogue
  58. Glossary
  59. Acknowledgments
  60. Notes

Having unilaterally decided that this was the way the world would be for the foreseeable future, the 2010 Review then emasculated British military capability. The consequences are far-reaching and difficult, if not near impossible, to reverse: 20,000 experienced regular soldiers were axed from the Army, nearly a quarter of its strength. Royal Navy frigate and destroyer numbers—the work horses of any fleet—were cut right back. Some ships came off station from the Libyan maritime embargo in 2011 and sailed direct to the breaker’s yard. It seemed quite extraordinary to me at the time to see our warships being broken up at the very moment they were most needed. The unraveling of Libya and the deepening turmoil of the Arab Spring ought to have told any politician with any sense that the world was not as safe and predictable as they were busy assuring us it was. Not only were Royal Air Force fast-jet numbers removed from the inventory, but that essential capability for a proud maritime nation, maritime patrol aircraft, was also disbanded. It would be difficult to overstate the disbelief of our allies or delight of our enemies at this shortsighted decision.

When I said in London’s Sunday Times at the end of March 2014, as I stepped down as DSACEUR, that this was a “hell of a gamble,” the Defense Secretary was so infuriated at being questioned in public that I was summoned by General Sir Peter Wall, the head of the British Army, and told that the Defense Secretary had wanted “formal action” taken against me. However, formal action would have involved a court-martial and, fortunately for the latter’s political reputation—it also seems he had not appreciated that I reported to NATO and not to him—wiser counsel had prevailed. But the damage to our armed forces and, through them, our ability to defend our national interests—the first duty of any government—had already been done.

This failure to understand the realities of dealing with bullies was further reinforced during Britain’s response to the crisis in the Middle East, caused by the eruption on the scene of the so-called Islamic State in the summer of 2014. Both the Prime Minister and the new Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, recently moved into post from Defense Minister (where, after threatening me, he had continued to oversee the rundown of British forces) waxed apocalyptic on the threat IS posed and yet did nothing credible to confront that threat. Foreign Secretary Hammond’s hubristic boast that “Britain defined itself by the extent to which it punched above its weight” was proved hollow.