And there were larger considerations, to do with the health of the aerospace industry, which Michaels was able to point to. A new, big aerospace initiative would give the economy a massive — if inflationary — boost. And, for the benefit of the politicians, he played on a suspicion dating back to the 1950s that of all the services, the USAF was the most out of political control when it came to space. The service had campaigned from the beginning to be given its own space program, independently of whatever NASA got up to; and in recent years, it was felt, USAF insistence had damagingly distorted the goals of the Skylab project. Besides, a manned Mars mission coupled with the new military work could be attractive in PR terms: the U.S. is not afraid to defend itself, but it is still rich and strong enough to dream of other worlds…

So a new, focused civilian space program — rich in new technology, but lying outside the reach of the DoD, in particular the USAF — could be presented as politically attractive.

And so the arguments went on, orchestrated by Michaels and Josephson, who gathered the forces of national policy around themselves to shape the program the way they wanted it; until, at last, it all spiraled into realms of economic theory and political infighting that left Joe Muldoon, a mere moonwalker, stranded on the ground.

Late in the process, Michaels and his staff, including Muldoon, were summoned to a meeting at the White House with DoD and Bureau of the Budget delegations to discuss NASA’s proposals. And then Reagan himself called a meeting of Cabinet members, and NASA, BoB, DoD, and MIT officials.

Michaels was obviously exhausted, but Muldoon could see he did his best to bring his remaining energies to bear on the Cabinet Room meeting. He knew he had almost won the argument, but this final hurdle still had to be crossed.

Reagan asked surprisingly sharp questions on wider aspects of the proposal. It seemed to Muldoon that he was seeking to pick out some element of it which he could deploy to his own advantage — just as had Kennedy two decades earlier. And Michaels was trying to work to Reagan’s expectations; he implied that, just as with Kennedy, Reagan would find a big space initiative helpful with congressional power brokers, and he could use it to build up support for other plans…

But Reagan balked anew at the cost, and he and his staff began to scour through the program, picking away elements of it.

Muldoon was forced to watch, helpless, as in the rooms of the White House his careful test and development program was cut to the bone, all talk of Venus-orbit missions and Mars bases was dropped, and the three Mars flights were reduced — incredibly — to just a single shot.