Hereford had tried to pull the men back into some semblance of order, but with no clear command it had been an exercise in futility. The English had been forced to retreat, giving Bruce if not his first victory, his first nondefeat of the battle.

The second had come slightly to the east of the New Park, where Clifford and de Beaumont, also in advance, had led a force of eight hundred cavalry on a quest to find an alternative route to Stirling through the boggy, inhospitable carse. They’d nearly surprised Thomas Randolph, the Earl of Moray, who with his men was positioned near St. Ninian’s and was supposed to be guarding the flank for Bruce. Moray recovered in time, and after a hard-fought battle, his schiltrons of infantrymen, too, forced the English into their second retreat of the day.

King Edward had arrived at the Bannock Burn to the shocking news that not only had the vanguard of vaunted English cavalry engaged the enemy twice—without his knowledge—but both times they’d been repulsed by Bruce’s infantry pikemen. The flower of English chivalry defeated by farmers! It was inconceivable! Humiliating! At least it was to Edward. The armies weren’t that unbalanced, of course—Bruce’s men were skilled warriors—but to say that the mood among the English was disheartened was putting it mildly.

A situation that grew worse when the English were forced to set up camp for the night on the boggy, damp carse of mud, streams, and peaty “pols” of water, as the Scots called them. Most of the carts and infantry had to stay on the other side of the Bannock Burn, unable to cross, despite the doors and shutters that had been ripped down from houses to give them traction and make the ground more solid. There was plenty of water to water the horses, but moving them about in this type of terrain was slow and difficult.

It wasn’t the retreats, low morale, or uncomfortable night that had convinced Alex what he had to do—no matter what the risk—it was the utter ineptitude of the English leadership. The army was unorganized and hampered by a ridiculously long train of supplies that stretched for twenty leagues—Despenser had even brought furniture, for Christ’s sake, for the earldom of Moray that the king had promised him. Furthermore, King Edward had no real battle plan (arrogantly believing that Bruce would retreat or be no match for the “superior” English troops—despite recent proof to the contrary), and he’d not only failed to put an end to the squabbling among his commanders, he’d actually made it worse by fueling the bad blood between Gloucester and Hereford by appointing them joint commanders, leaving the important vanguard of the army without clear directive.