Chapters (65)
- Cover
- Title Page
- Dedication
- Authors’ Note
- 1. ‘IF ANYONE MOVES, FIRE MAARO’
- 2. DAWN ABDUCTION
- 3. WAITING GAME
- 4. ‘BREAKING’ SALIM
- 5. THE CONFESSION
- 6. AN ENCOUNTER
- 7. ‘LEADER IS IN INDIA ALREADY’
- 8. BABAJI’S MAN WITH NO EXIT PLAN
- 9. ‘MAN OF RESPECT’ IN HYDERABAD
- 10. TRACKING SALIM
- 11. HOLDING BACK
- 12. WHAT IS SALIM HIDING?
- 13. POULTRY FARM YIELDS 143 CHICKENS, 380 EGGS, 2 PAKISTANI ‘GUESTS’
- 14. A TOOTH FOR A TOOTH
- 15. OPERATION TROJAN HORSE
- 16. THE YOUNG DRONE-MAKER
- 17. AN AMBUSH
- 18. MURDER AND RETRIBUTION
- 19. NEW RECRUITS
- 20. BUNGALOW NUMBER 105
- 21. A STEP INTO THE PAST
- 22. TRAINING
- 23. GIVING INDIA A ‘THOUSAND CUTS’
- 24. THE GAME BEGINS
- 25. SHOOT TO KILL
- 26. KRAV MAGA, KALI AND TRACKING SKILLS
- 27. THE MIND OF NAWAZ
- 28. KEY CONCEPTS
- 29. THE SACRIFICE
- 30. ‘ONCE IS A COINCIDENCE, TWICE IS ENEMY ACTION’
- 31. FIRST CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY
- 32. BREAKTHROUGH IN KISHANGANJ
- 33. ROAD TO THAMEL
- 34. THE EAGLES ARE FLYING
- 35. KARACHI APPOINTMENT WITH LeT BOSSES
- 36. DAWN AT BAYT AL-MUJAHIDEEN
- 37. RPGs AND DUCKING LIVE BULLETS
- 38. SAFFRON MILK AND A GAME OF CHESS
- 39. RETURN TO INDIA
- 40. THE FIRST ASSIGNMENT
- 41. LOOKING FOR ATIF
- 42. TERROR ON A PLATE
- 43. MURDER IN THE DARK
- 44. RING THE BELLS
- 45. THE TOAST OF LeT
- 46. BACK TO THE DEN
- 47. ‘YOU COULD KILL JUST TWO, BABAR?’
- 48. FIRST TARGET
- 49. DEHRADUN
- 50. TIME FOR REVENGE
- 51. TERROR AT BVP HEADQUARTERS
- 52. KARACHI IN MOURNING
- 53. GUNNING FOR THE CM
- 54. A SUMMONS TO KARACHI
- 55. A SERIES OF BOMBINGS
- 56. BREACHING THE BASTION
- 57. THE LAST HURRAH
- 58. ATTACKING THE CRPF CITADEL
- 59. A PROMOTION
- 60. THE NIGHT OF 26/11
- About the Authors
Both the attacks had been snuffed out at the entrances of the two targeted sites, causing embarrassment to the LeT’s ability to orchestrate high-value strikes in what it called India’s ‘hinterland’, referring to the rest of the country barring Jammu and Kashmir, whose ‘liberation’ was LeT’s raison d’etre.
Abu-Lakhvi, during the threadbare analysis of the two operations, which had looked at how the preparations had been conducted at every stage by the LeT, had dubbed Abu-Muzammil, Al-Wali and Babar ‘nikammay’, good-for-nothing burdens on the organization.
‘The Powai operation was done well even though we failed to kill more than two people. We killed a well-known US scientist, which must have shamed India before America and the “first world”, as the white-skinned call themselves. The killing of the senior BASRC scientist too was a feat, as it would have adversely affected India’s nuclear armament plans, and that is why our friends in the ISI personally reached out to me to offer their appreciation,’ Abu-Lakhvi had said. ‘And that is why I had said that all of you who are part of Abu-Muzammil’s setup did well. I even promoted Babar as a token of my appreciation.
‘But why did the IMA and Pune operations fail? The planning was good, the execution was good, but six fidayeen were killed as if they were sitting ducks. What do we have to show in return? Nothing. We could not kill even one of our targets,’ Abu-Lakhvi had then raged.
‘Is Pakistani blood so cheap? I suspect they got wind of our plans. So from now on, use satellite phones and landlines more than mobile phones to reduce the risk of somebody intercepting our conversations. As I keep saying, PCOs are the safest.’
Abu-Lakhvi had paused and stared intently at each man in turn before continuing. ‘More importantly, is there any breach in LeT, whether in our structure in Pakistan or in India, including Kashmir? Do we have any spies of India amid us? Agents from R&IW or CTC?
‘Let us hope these are just my suspicions. It is better to question ourselves and keep looking to rectify our weaknesses than be ignoramuses and strut around like foolish peacocks.’
It hadn’t been said in so many words to Babar, but he felt that since he was an Indian, his commitment and integrity were being doubted by Abu-Lakhvi, which pained him.
The discussion in the room had gone on for three hours and had concluded only when Abu-Lakhvi had asked an aide to switch on the 7 p.m. BBC news broadcast. He did not like to miss the BBC news broadcasts, especially those at 7 p.m. and 11 p.m. He was of the view that the BBC represented the best of the UK’s neoliberal school of thought, which backed Pakistan’s stance on the ‘disputed’ status of Jammu and Kashmir.