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Chapters (65)
  1. Cover
  2. Title Page
  3. Dedication
  4. Authors’ Note
  5. 1. ‘IF ANYONE MOVES, FIRE MAARO’
  6. 2. DAWN ABDUCTION
  7. 3. WAITING GAME
  8. 4. ‘BREAKING’ SALIM
  9. 5. THE CONFESSION
  10. 6. AN ENCOUNTER
  11. 7. ‘LEADER IS IN INDIA ALREADY’
  12. 8. BABAJI’S MAN WITH NO EXIT PLAN
  13. 9. ‘MAN OF RESPECT’ IN HYDERABAD
  14. 10. TRACKING SALIM
  15. 11. HOLDING BACK
  16. 12. WHAT IS SALIM HIDING?
  17. 13. POULTRY FARM YIELDS 143 CHICKENS, 380 EGGS, 2 PAKISTANI ‘GUESTS’
  18. 14. A TOOTH FOR A TOOTH
  19. 15. OPERATION TROJAN HORSE
  20. 16. THE YOUNG DRONE-MAKER
  21. 17. AN AMBUSH
  22. 18. MURDER AND RETRIBUTION
  23. 19. NEW RECRUITS
  24. 20. BUNGALOW NUMBER 105
  25. 21. A STEP INTO THE PAST
  26. 22. TRAINING
  27. 23. GIVING INDIA A ‘THOUSAND CUTS’
  28. 24. THE GAME BEGINS
  29. 25. SHOOT TO KILL
  30. 26. KRAV MAGA, KALI AND TRACKING SKILLS
  31. 27. THE MIND OF NAWAZ
  32. 28. KEY CONCEPTS
  33. 29. THE SACRIFICE
  34. 30. ‘ONCE IS A COINCIDENCE, TWICE IS ENEMY ACTION’
  35. 31. FIRST CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY
  36. 32. BREAKTHROUGH IN KISHANGANJ
  37. 33. ROAD TO THAMEL
  38. 34. THE EAGLES ARE FLYING
  39. 35. KARACHI APPOINTMENT WITH LeT BOSSES
  40. 36. DAWN AT BAYT AL-MUJAHIDEEN
  41. 37. RPGs AND DUCKING LIVE BULLETS
  42. 38. SAFFRON MILK AND A GAME OF CHESS
  43. 39. RETURN TO INDIA
  44. 40. THE FIRST ASSIGNMENT
  45. 41. LOOKING FOR ATIF
  46. 42. TERROR ON A PLATE
  47. 43. MURDER IN THE DARK
  48. 44. RING THE BELLS
  49. 45. THE TOAST OF LeT
  50. 46. BACK TO THE DEN
  51. 47. ‘YOU COULD KILL JUST TWO, BABAR?’
  52. 48. FIRST TARGET
  53. 49. DEHRADUN
  54. 50. TIME FOR REVENGE
  55. 51. TERROR AT BVP HEADQUARTERS
  56. 52. KARACHI IN MOURNING
  57. 53. GUNNING FOR THE CM
  58. 54. A SUMMONS TO KARACHI
  59. 55. A SERIES OF BOMBINGS
  60. 56. BREACHING THE BASTION
  61. 57. THE LAST HURRAH
  62. 58. ATTACKING THE CRPF CITADEL
  63. 59. A PROMOTION
  64. 60. THE NIGHT OF 26/11
  65. About the Authors

Both the attacks had been snuffed out at the entrances of the two targeted sites, causing embarrassment to the LeT’s ability to orchestrate high-value strikes in what it called India’s ‘hinterland’, referring to the rest of the country barring Jammu and Kashmir, whose ‘liberation’ was LeT’s raison d’etre.

Abu-Lakhvi, during the threadbare analysis of the two operations, which had looked at how the preparations had been conducted at every stage by the LeT, had dubbed Abu-Muzammil, Al-Wali and Babar ‘nikammay’, good-for-nothing burdens on the organization.

‘The Powai operation was done well even though we failed to kill more than two people. We killed a well-known US scientist, which must have shamed India before America and the “first world”, as the white-skinned call themselves. The killing of the senior BASRC scientist too was a feat, as it would have adversely affected India’s nuclear armament plans, and that is why our friends in the ISI personally reached out to me to offer their appreciation,’ Abu-Lakhvi had said. ‘And that is why I had said that all of you who are part of Abu-Muzammil’s setup did well. I even promoted Babar as a token of my appreciation.

‘But why did the IMA and Pune operations fail? The planning was good, the execution was good, but six fidayeen were killed as if they were sitting ducks. What do we have to show in return? Nothing. We could not kill even one of our targets,’ Abu-Lakhvi had then raged.

‘Is Pakistani blood so cheap? I suspect they got wind of our plans. So from now on, use satellite phones and landlines more than mobile phones to reduce the risk of somebody intercepting our conversations. As I keep saying, PCOs are the safest.’

Abu-Lakhvi had paused and stared intently at each man in turn before continuing. ‘More importantly, is there any breach in LeT, whether in our structure in Pakistan or in India, including Kashmir? Do we have any spies of India amid us? Agents from R&IW or CTC?

‘Let us hope these are just my suspicions. It is better to question ourselves and keep looking to rectify our weaknesses than be ignoramuses and strut around like foolish peacocks.’

It hadn’t been said in so many words to Babar, but he felt that since he was an Indian, his commitment and integrity were being doubted by Abu-Lakhvi, which pained him.

The discussion in the room had gone on for three hours and had concluded only when Abu-Lakhvi had asked an aide to switch on the 7 p.m. BBC news broadcast. He did not like to miss the BBC news broadcasts, especially those at 7 p.m. and 11 p.m. He was of the view that the BBC represented the best of the UK’s neoliberal school of thought, which backed Pakistan’s stance on the ‘disputed’ status of Jammu and Kashmir.