‘US Nobel laureate, BASRC scientist killed in suspected LeT terror attack’; ‘Two Pak gunmen breach high-security cordon at IIS&T to rain bullets, grenades; security agencies suspect role of local sleeper cell in assisting attack’ – so screamed the headlines of the daily with the largest circulation in the country.

At his flat, Atharv’s head had been buried in the newspaper for the past ten minutes. The cup of tea that he had made for himself lay untouched on a small table by his armchair.

Atharv had a gut feeling that Al-Wali’s demand for their voter ID cards had had something to do with the terror attack at IIS&T. The Pakistani attackers who were ‘suspected LeT operatives’ as per police sources quoted in the newspaper reports had probably used the covert CTC team’s identity particulars to enter India. A chill ran down his spine and Atharv shuddered at the thought of having been an accomplice. The newspaper reflected the sense of shock and horror that the city and the rest of India was experiencing on learning about the audacious terror strike at IIS&T, which had killed America’s most famous nuclear scientist and a top BASRC scientist. The two had been part of a team that was overseeing the construction of Sarika-2, an upcoming civilian nuclear reactor at Ratnagiri in Maharashtra.

Sarika-2 was also under the scanner of the global atomic energy regulatory authority, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for its suspected dual end-use. While the reactor was to provide 800 megawatts of electricity to the region’s horticulture-based enterprises, which exported delicacies such as the Alphonso mango, its spent fuel could also be used to produce nuclear weapons, according to IAEA secretary Thomas Burns.

Burns, an Austrian physicist, was reckoned to be a US-backed appointee to the IAEA, and was insisting upon the enforcement of the non-proliferation regime against de facto nuclear weapon states such as India and Pakistan, which had conducted underground nuclear tests in 1998. Meanwhile, China, a veto-wielding member of the United Nations Security Council, wanted to control IAEA to strangle India’s nuclear ambitions as part of its strategy to contain the latter’s growth as a regional power in South Asia. It was for the same reason that it was aiding Pakistan’s clandestine imports to buttress that country’s weaponization programme.

An hour later, Atharv rushed to a nearby PCO. He dialled Somaiya’s pre-paid mobile number. Somaiya’s number, Atharv smiled, had changed thrice in the last three months since he had arrived from Pakistan. ?‘Atharv, did you know?’ Somaiya asked as soon as he answered his phone.

‘No, sir, the fuckers kept it all hush-hush. We are of course assuming that it was an LeT operation at IIS&T. But, sir, you know those identity documents that Al-Wali had asked me to send to him? I think they were for this operation!’ Atharv shared his apprehensions.