But in the second war in Iraq, owing in large measure to the cruise missile threat posed by Iraq, the land commander retained control of these weapons. In the event, the cruise missile launch sites were quickly overrun in the opening days of the war, and the Iraqi Air Force, having learned its lesson in 1991, did not challenge our air superiority team of radars and fighter aircraft. Many have concluded—given the nature of the threat and the tragic mistakes resulting from the kind of control in place—that the air-component commander, General Mosley, should have been given command of the Patriots. If that had been the case, it is doubtful that the Patriots would have shot down two allied aircraft by mistake, killing their crews. Another time, because of confusion over the rules of engagement and faulty operations by Patriot crews, a defense-suppression F-16 armed with radar homing missiles destroyed a Patriot radar when it illuminated the aircraft. Fortunately, no one on the ground was injured.

Because land forces often still believe they are the main element in the battle and therefore must own all other elements deployed to the fight, the issue of command is still argued strenuously—especially by older officers. Younger officers, however, are much more attuned to how best to organize efficiently and to coordinate land, sea, air, and space operations on a trust not ownership basis. On those occasions when the Services do have command issues, the effects are likely to be worse when the forces of other nations are brought together with ours.

Because they do not require stringent command or ownership arrangements to accomplish their missions, air and sea forces normally find it easy to operate together. Land forces, however, normally do require stringent command arrangements, and as a result geographical separation is used to resolve difficult command issues. This works in wars with orderly, linear battle lines. But it cannot work in modern wars where the battlefield is increasingly chaotic and high-speed maneuver takes the place of orderly arrangements of forces. The maintenance of order inhibits speed, which is now the vital element in achieving dominance over your enemy. Furthermore, in future wars like those in Kosovo and Afghanistan, where coalition ground forces are of greater importance than those of the United States, command of U.S. ground forces may be delegated to foreign generals . . . a situation our military has forcefully resisted since Pershing led the American Expeditionary Force in 1917.

The command aspects of warfare will continue to challenge our coalition military and political leaders as each new conflict is addressed. The control of military operations is also fraught with issues that must be resolved.