The tenuous status of German POWs was exacerbated by the return of American soldiers, many wounded, who would need to recover and then find work. It was a complicated matter because certain factions wanted the POWs to remain in the United States and others wanted them gone. Labor unions, committed to the employment of American workers, wanted the German prisoners returned to Europe immediately, while farmers wanted to hold on to the cheap POW labor. Not only had they grown to depend on the Germans to tend to their farms, but an unexpected bond had developed, and a fair number of American farm families wanted the POWs to stay.7 It was an emotional topic that the government did not want to see spiral out of control.

Some congressmen and senators argued emphatically that the POWs needed to leave the United States immediately and go home to Europe, where they could rebuild all the areas the Nazis had destroyed. Still, the farmers and industry leaders didn’t back down. They insisted that low-wage prisoner of war labor had kept their farms and factories in business. Several politicians, indeed, discovered that even with the POWs, there was still a labor shortage—so these industries risked ruin if the prisoners departed immediately.8

Although it was unlikely that returning soldiers would feel threatened by jobs German POWs were doing, which were disparagingly referred to as “stoop-labor,” the government could not risk having the public believe their loved ones would be competing with German POWs for jobs, no matter how remote the likelihood of such competition. Brigadier General B.M. Bryan, assistant provost marshal general, released a statement to emphasize the government’s commitment to its soldiers. “We are not going to prevent any American from getting a job because of a prisoner. . . . If there’s a civilian for the job he gets it.”9 But the truth was that no one had a clear-cut solution.

The War Department initially said it would first return the prisoners it deemed “useless,” meaning the sick, the insane, and the unrepentant Nazis, but that announcement wasn’t well received. Some Americans thought it wasn’t fair for the hard-core ideological POWs to be able to leave captivity so quickly and resume their lives back in Germany. “Genuine Nazis are being rewarded for their convictions with a speedy reunion with their families,” according to a May 31, 1945 New York Times article.10

Moreover, the logistics of sending almost 400,000 German soldiers back to a battered and fragile Europe was daunting. There had been little guidance provided by the Geneva Convention about the return of prisoners in circumstances of an “unconditional surrender.” In place was a broadly worded provision in Article 75 stating that, “In any case, the repatriation of prisoners shall be effected as soon as possible after the conclusion of peace.”11 There were no firm deadlines, which gave the United States flexibility. However, the continued care and guarding of POWs in Europe and the United States were unsustainable.