Back Rites of Passage
Chapters (34)
  1. Cover
  2. Sanjoy Hazarika
  3. RITES OF PASSAGE
  4. Dedication
  5. Foreword
  6. Chapter One
  7. Chapter Two
  8. Chapter Three
  9. Chapter Four
  10. Chapter Five
  11. Chapter Six
  12. Chapter Seven
  13. Chapter Eight
  14. Chapter Nine
  15. Chapter Ten
  16. Chapter Eleven
  17. Chapter Twelve
  18. Chapter Thirteen
  19. Chapter Fourteen
  20. Appendices
  21. Footnotes
  22. Chapter Three
  23. Chapter Four
  24. Chapter Six
  25. Chapter Seven
  26. Chapter Eight
  27. Chapter Nine
  28. Chapter Eleven
  29. Chapter Twelve
  30. Chapter Thirteen
  31. Chapter Fourteen
  32. Appendices
  33. Bibliography
  34. Acknowledgements
Document

The rationale behind the demand for English was fairly obvious: it would have meant the severance of any connection to the Indian heartland.

Since 1993, the Bodo demand for separation from Assam has become extremely strident, assuming a violent character that aims at ousting non-Bodos from an area which militants have claimed as, their traditional homeland. This geographical belt stretches in their lexicon from the Sunkosh river that flows down from Bhutan and joins the Brahmaputra to the once-thriving river port of Sadiya, near Arunachal Pradesh.

Sadiya, of course, no longer exists, having been buried deep in the bosom of the Brahmaputra after the great earthquake of 1950. But rhetoric often buries reason as well. In this region, the Bodos do not add up either to a numerical majority or a community that has the advantage of linguistic and geographical contiguity. They are dispersed for the most part and are small minorities in many areas.

That is why when the Government of India, under the direction of the Minister of State for Home Affairs, Rajesh Pilot, and the Assam government under Hiteswar Saikia agreed to set up an autonomous Bodoland Council, they were asking for trouble. The Bodos kept up a stream of demands to include areas with non-Bodo populations in this territory. The other side was equally adamant in refusing these demands.

Bodos began moving from the Kokrajhar belt to other parts of northern Assam with the support and connivance of local politicians in the 1970s. But this became a significant trend in the 1990s as part of a strategy by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland of Ranjan Daimuri, which wants an independent country, to change the demographic profile of districts like Sonitpur.5 A substantial part of this movement took place quietly.6

When negotiations kept stalling and failing on the inclusion of more areas, Bodo militant groups, led by the Bodoland Security Force (later to become the Bodoland Tiger Force) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), organized pogroms of communities which had lived in these areas for generations. The major target were Santhals, a group which had been settled there since the latter part of the nineteenth century. At the time, they were transported by the British to work as labourers on tea plantations. Over the years, the Santhals settled on the land in their traditional style—in isolated hamlets practising subsistence agriculture. In fierce attacks on the Santhals in May 1996, the Bodos drove tens of thousands from their homes and forced them to take shelter in refugee camps set up by the state government. The Santhals, no mean fighters themselves, retaliated with their traditional weapons—bows and arrows as well as daos (machetes).

Nearly 200,000 persons, non-Bodos for the most part, and Bodos, continue to live in unsanitary conditions, cheek by jowl, with little sustenance but irregular government doles. Some who went back to their homes have become refugees a second time after the Bodos descended on them again and made them leave.