Take the impact of a small outflow from a neighbouring country into a small frontier state of India, Mizoram. This little state, with borders with Myanmar, plays host to about 20,000 economic migrants from Myanmar as well as a handful of political activists from there. The refugees in Mizoram—known political activists—are not more than about 100; a substantial number of these have been given identity cards by the local government to prevent harassment by police and Mizo public organizations.

The latter, led by the powerful Young Mizo Association, want the Burmese out of their region, accusing them of fomenting civil disturbances and organizing illicit stills, theft and drug running. Most of the migrants are of the Chin community, who are racially, linguistically, as well as by faith, (they are largely Christian) of the same stock as the Mizos. The majority are handloom weavers, labourers and domestics; some are petty traders, and few even have tea shops and restaurants. While some may be criminals, most are peaceful men and women, seeking to eke out a living with their traditional skills.

These include people who are born in Myanmar but see no problem in relocating themselves in Mizoram. I have personally met Mizos from Myanmar who came over to Aizawl in 1986 after a twenty-year-old Mizo insurgency against India ended. They were working with the Mizo National Front, the Mizo insurgent group, then based in the Chin state of Myanmar. And when the other Mizos returned, they too went along and settled in Mizoram!

The population of Mizoram is about 700,000; it is supporting a migrant population of Chins and also of Chakmas from Bangladesh. While there are indigenous Chakmas, the rapid increase in population has placed them under suspicion of the dominant Mizos. The Chakmas are Buddhist, ethnically different and easy to spot.

As far as the Chins are concerned, the UNHCR recognizes and supports another 650 as Burmese political refugees in New Delhi, and there are demands from another 150 for refugee status. Even these figures are disputed by Burmese political exiles based in India, some of whom say that the actual number of refugees in New Delhi should not be more than 300. The others, they assert, are economic migrants who want to use their refugee status as a bargaining tool to get to a third country, preferably the United States, Australia, or Europe.

The problem is complicated by the involvement of Indian intelligence agencies such as the Intelligence Bureau, the Research and Analysis Wing, the Subsidiary Special Bureau and Military Intelligence, as well as the local state intelligence groups which seek information and leverage among the exiles, especially the political activists and military cadres based in North East India. Some of these groups are used as ‘spotters’ (security agents to identify hostile groups and individuals) and paid for their services—to check for information such as troop movements and other details of strategic interest.