Back Point of Contact
Chapters (83)
  1. Cover
  2. ALSO BY TOM CLANCY
  3. PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS
  4. 1
  5. 2
  6. 3
  7. 4
  8. 5
  9. 6
  10. 7
  11. 8
  12. 9
  13. 10
  14. 11
  15. 12
  16. 13
  17. 14
  18. 15
  19. 16
  20. 17
  21. 18
  22. 19
  23. 20
  24. 21
  25. 22
  26. 23
  27. 24
  28. 25
  29. 26
  30. 27
  31. 28
  32. 29
  33. 30
  34. 31
  35. 32
  36. 33
  37. 34
  38. 35
  39. 36
  40. 37
  41. 38
  42. 39
  43. 40
  44. 41
  45. 42
  46. 43
  47. 44
  48. 45
  49. 46
  50. 47
  51. 48
  52. 49
  53. 50
  54. 51
  55. 52
  56. 53
  57. 54
  58. 55
  59. 56
  60. 57
  61. 58
  62. 59
  63. 60
  64. 61
  65. 62
  66. 63
  67. 64
  68. 65
  69. 66
  70. 67
  71. 68
  72. 69
  73. 70
  74. 71
  75. 72
  76. 73
  77. 74
  78. 75
  79. 76
  80. 77
  81. 78
  82. 79
  83. What’s next onyour reading list?

“Agreed,” Mary Pat said. “But that’s why their missile and nuclear programs are so important. The majority of North Koreans have no access to outside news sources, and most of them have been brainwashed to believe that the United States and our allies are aggressively seeking the chance to invade. But the North Korean people aren’t stupid. They see the scarcity of resources and they’re the ones that have suffered the most under this regime. So when they see Chairman Choi spending billions of dollars on nuclear bombs and long-range missiles instead of food and housing, it only reinforces the government’s message that the West is hostile—otherwise, why would the ‘benevolent’ government spend all that money? It’s a devil’s logic, but it works.”

“For the true believers it works. But the dissidents know better,” the secretary of state said.

Mary Pat shook her head. “But the dissidents are quickly killed or imprisoned in one of Choi’s gulags. Compared to their internal security apparatus, Stalin’s NKVD looks like a wedding planning service.”

Ryan leaned forward on the table, folding his hands. “So to bottom line this discussion, what we’re saying is that the North Korean missile and nuclear programs are about external and internal security, which really means it’s all about Choi Ha-guk staying in power. Is that right?”

The others nodded in agreement. Mary Pat added, “So long as any member of the Choi family is in power, the North Koreans will continue to pursue their missile and nuclear programs.”

“Okay. So the first question on the table is this: What can the United States do about that? How can we effect regime change unilaterally?”

“Without Chinese cooperation, we can’t—and we certainly wouldn’t want to risk a conflict with them,” Burgess said.

Ryan turned to Burgess. “Forget China for just one minute. Is it even possible for us to overthrow the Choi power structure through overt military action?”

“We’ve been war-gaming scenarios about this for over six decades—technically, we’re still in a state of war with North Korea. Under the best scenario, we would expect mass civilian casualties in South Korea and the deaths of many thousands more in the north. If ever there was a definition of a Pyrrhic victory, this would be it.”

Secretary of State Adler quickly added, “Which is why our South Korean allies are completely against any kind of offensive military action.”

“What about a complete economic embargo?” Ryan asked.

“For all intents and purposes, there is one—except the Chinese might not enforce it. Without their complete cooperation, it isn’t possible,” Adler said. “And even if it were, it would only hurt the innocent civilians. The leaders won’t suffer. If you include food in the embargo, then another mass famine would result.”