Back Point of Contact
Chapters (83)
  1. Cover
  2. ALSO BY TOM CLANCY
  3. PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS
  4. 1
  5. 2
  6. 3
  7. 4
  8. 5
  9. 6
  10. 7
  11. 8
  12. 9
  13. 10
  14. 11
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  83. What’s next onyour reading list?

“Or it’s not the KN-11 at all,” the SecDef said, preferring the American designation. “It could be an entirely different weapon. It has nearly the same performance characteristics as our Polaris A-1, which we first deployed back in 1962.”

Jack Ryan smiled to himself. It never failed to amaze him how technologically advanced the United States was compared to the rest of the world. Most of the planet still wasn’t able to achieve what his parents’ generation had accomplished fifty years earlier.

Mary Pat continued. “Our second concern is that we had no idea that the North Koreans had acquired MIRV technology—another intelligence failure.” She frowned when she said this. As the titular head of America’s civilian intelligence community, she felt personally responsible for the current crisis.

“Third, because they’ve acquired MIRV technology, it’s only a matter of time before they move from three warheads to seven, ten, or even more on this platform. Multiple, independently targeted warheads means that each missile has more target opportunities and greater capacity to defeat any kind of ABM defense with decoys and countermeasures. That changes the strategic equation in Asia, especially when the North Koreans are able to arm them with nuclear warheads. But what’s particularly worrisome is the idea of the North Koreans deploying MIRV technology on their land-based ICBM platforms. The Taepodong-3 has a range of eight thousand miles. At that point they become a world power, like it or not.”

“And we removed all of our MIRVs from our ICBMs a few years ago,” Ryan said. He was a trained security analyst, so it didn’t take long for him to process the implications. “If we don’t stop the North Koreans from MIRVing, we’ll have to go back to it ourselves, and that will launch another nuclear arms race between us, the Russians, and the Chinese.”

“Exactly our concerns, Mr. President,” Mary Pat said as the SecDef nodded in agreement.

Ryan sighed, frustrated. Like everyone else involved at the time, he assumed that the coup ousting Choi Ji-hoon two years ago was going to solve the North Korean problem. Obviously it hadn’t.

Ryan rubbed his chin, thinking. “Can someone please tell me why the North Koreans are still hell-bent on their strategic nuclear program? They still can’t produce enough food to feed their own people.”

“We’ve been asking ourselves that same question since their first nuclear test in 2006,” the SecState said. “Power, prestige, leverage, blackmail. Pick one. Or pick all of them.”

“They also see it as a deterrent,” Mary Pat said.

The President frowned. “Deterrent? From whom?”

“From us, the South Koreans, and the West, generally. And even China, truth be told, especially after the role they played in Ji-hoon’s overthrow.”

“Nobody is planning on invading North Korea,” the SecDef said. “This idea of Western aggression is all a fiction, designed to keep the population under control.”