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Chapters (73)
  1. LINE Of CONTROL
  2. Acknowledgments
  3. PROLOGUE.
  4. CHAPTER ONE.
  5. CHAPTER TWO.
  6. CHAPTER THREE.
  7. CHAPTER FOUR.
  8. CHAPTER FIVE.
  9. CHAPTER SIX.
  10. CHAPTER SEVEN.
  11. CHAPTER EIGHT.
  12. CHAPTER NINE.
  13. CHAPTER TEN.
  14. CHAPTER ELEVEN.
  15. CHAPTER TWELVE.
  16. CHAPTER THIRTEEN.
  17. CHAPTER FOURTEEN.
  18. CHAPTER FIFTEEN.
  19. CHAPTER SIXTEEN.
  20. CHAPTER SEVENTEEN.
  21. CHAPTER EIGHTEEN.
  22. CHAPTER NINETEEN.
  23. CHAPTER TWENTY.
  24. CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE.
  25. CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO.
  26. CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE.
  27. CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR.
  28. CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE.
  29. CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX.
  30. CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN.
  31. CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT.
  32. CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE.
  33. CHAPTER THIRTY.
  34. CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE.
  35. CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO.
  36. CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE.
  37. CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR.
  38. CHAPTER THIRTY-FIVE.
  39. CHAPTER THIRTY-SIX.
  40. CHAPTER THIRTY-SEVEN.
  41. CHAPTER THIRTY-EIGHT.
  42. CHAPTER THIRTY-NINE.
  43. CHAPTER FORTY.
  44. CHAPTER FORTY-ONE.
  45. CHAPTER FORTY-TWO.
  46. CHAPTER FORTY-THREE.
  47. CHAPTER FORTY-FOUR.
  48. CHAPTER FORTY-FIVE.
  49. CHAPTER FORTY-SIX.
  50. CHAPTER FORTY-SEVEN.
  51. CHAPTER FORTY-EIGHT.
  52. CHAPTER FORTY-NINE.
  53. CHAPTER FIFTY.
  54. CHAPTER FIFTY-ONE.
  55. CHAPTER FIFTY-TWO.
  56. CHAPTER FIFTY-THREE.
  57. CHAPTER FIFTY-FOUR.
  58. CHAPTER FIFTY-FIVE.
  59. CHAPTER FIFTY-SIX.
  60. CHAPTER FIFTY-SEVEN.
  61. CHAPTER FIFTY-EIGHT.
  62. CHAPTER FIFTY-NINE.
  63. CHAPTER SIXTY.
  64. CHAPTER SIXTY-ONE.
  65. CHAPTER SIXTY-TWO.
  66. CHAPTER SIXTY-THREE.
  67. CHAPTER SIXTY-FOUR.
  68. CHAPTER SIXTY-FIVE.
  69. CHAPTER SIXTY-SIX.
  70. CHAPTER SIXTY-SEVEN.
  71. CHAPTER SIXTY-EIGHT.
  72. CHAPTER SIXTY-NINE.
  73. CHAPTER SEVENTY.

"Thank you, Apu, for saving me a second time," Rodgers said. Throwing off a small salute, he turned and followed the others to the northeast.

CHAPTER FIFTY-FIVE.

Washington, D. C. Thursday, 4:30 p. m.

Paul Hood watched the clock turn on his computer.

"Make the call. Bob," he said.

Bob Herbert and Lowell Coffey III were both in the office with Hood.

The door was closed and Bugs Benet had been told not to interrupt the men unless the president or Senator Fox was calling. Herbert picked up the wheelchair phone to call Brett August. Coffey was seated beside Herbert in a leather armchair. The attorney would be present for the remainder of the mission. His job was to counsel Hood regarding international legal matters that might come up.

Coffey had already strongly informed Hood that he was very unhappy with the idea on the table. That an American military officer was leading a team consisting of a Pakistani terrorist, an NSA agent, and what amounted to two Indian hostages. And he was taking them into what was apparently a Pakistani nuclear missile site that had been erected in disputed territory. The idea that this constituted an ad hoc United Nations security council team still wasn't working for him.

Hood agreed that Ambassador Simathna's plan was not a great idea.

Unfortunately, it was the only idea. Bob Herbert and Ron Plummer both backed Hood up on that.

The TAC-SAT number Herbert had to input included not just the number of the unit but a code to access the satellite.

This made it extremely difficult for someone to reach the TAC-SAT or use it if they found it. Hood waited while Herbert finished punching in the lengthy number.

As Hood had expected, he had not heard from the president and the members of the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committee. Over ninety minutes ago. Hood had e-mailed them a summary of the Pakistani plan. According to executive assistants to both President Lawrence and Senator Fox, they were still "studying" Op-Center's proposal.

After a short, angry debate with Coffey, Hood decided not to tell the president or Fox what kind of Pakistani military facility Rodgers was visiting. He did not want the CIA crawling all over sources in the region to try to find out what was out there. Coffey argued that with events moving beyond their direct control. Hood had a responsibility to give the president all the facts and hearsay at his disposal. And then it was up to the president, not Hood, to decide whether to call in the CIA. Hood disagreed. He had only Simathna's say-so that there was a nuclear site out there. Hood did not want to legitimize a possible Pakistani ploy by routing it through the White House and thus making it seem valid.

Moreover, Hews of a possible nuclear silo might trigger an Indian strike while Rodgers was out there. That, too, could serve Pakistani purposes by forcing the United States into a confrontation with India.